

The Unequal Protection of Civilians in Civil War:  
*How Governments Affect the Locations of UN  
Peacekeeping Deployments*



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## **Abstract**

How do the strategic interests of a host-government impact the locations of local UN peacekeeping deployment? Maintaining government consent while practicing impartiality represents one of the greatest challenges to peacekeeping missions. Previous research finds that peacekeepers are only effective at protecting civilians against rebel groups, but not against government forces. To understand obstacles to peacekeepers' efficacy, it is crucial to understand factors influencing peacekeeping deployment. Yet, existing studies do not account for the effect of the host-governments on local peacekeeping deployment. I provide the first framework of pathways a host-government can influence the geographical deployment of UN peacekeepers. I argue that, being the key grantor of consent, host-governments can influence peacekeeping deployment along their strategic preferences. If dissatisfied, the host-government can withdraw consent, limit freedom of movement, or exclude the UN from political processes. I hypothesize that the host-government has an incentive to deploy peacekeepers to ethnic constituencies of the government or of rebel groups. To test this incentive, I apply a sub-national statistical analysis in nine African countries with a mandate to protect civilians on monthly data from 2000 to 2011. I analyze whether peacekeeping deployments are affected by the political status of belligerent parties. Accounting for previous violence, my findings suggest that UN peacekeepers are deployed more, for a longer time, and in greater troop size to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than the government. This thesis highlights a crucial obstacle to the impartial efficacy of UN peacekeepers in the field.

**Keywords**— UN Peacekeeping - Government - Ethnic Bias - One-Sided-Violence

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# 1 | Introduction

A key principle of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations is to only deploy with consent from the host-government and parties to the conflict. Without consent from the parties, the UN risks becoming a party to the conflict. In practice, the UN treats the host-government as the sole grantor of consent for peacekeeping deployment. This is grounded in the host-government's sovereign right to decide over its territory - a core principle of the UN. Historically, the UN has only exited a peacekeeping mission from a country when a host-government has withdrawn its consent - not by any other party to the conflict. In practice, maintaining genuine host-government consent is one of the greatest challenges to the success of modern peacekeeping operations. A representative from the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan noted that 'every time there is a peak of tensions; when we release a report on human rights the government do not like, or we defend ourselves - supplies stop coming immediately. Visas are not delivered. Access becomes extremely difficult, and the government reduce our ability to monitor and report by reducing the number of staff we have. It lasts for a few months' (Sebastian and Gorur 2018; 26). How does the strategic interests of a host-government impact the locations of local UN peacekeeping deployment?

In this thesis, I argue that host-government can impact local peacekeeping deployment along its strategic preferences, which in turn impacts UN peacekeepers efficacy in the field. Across UN peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers are criticised for bipartisanship in conflict, failing to report and respond to violence committed by host-governments. The peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has 'often turned a blind eye to violations committed by the government,' (Guehenno 2015;121). In Sudan, peacekeepers are criticized for 'self-censorship' and 'non-reporting' on human rights abuses committed by the

government on civilians (Human Rights Watch 2014, Lynch 2014). Yet, in just a six-month period in 2015 the host-government of South Sudan restricted the UN's freedom of movement and delivery of supplies over 450 times (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). To improve the efficacy and impartiality of UN peacekeeping, it is imperative to systematically understand the influence of host-governments on local peacekeeping deployment.

I address the effect of host-governments' influence on local peacekeeping deployment by systematically analysing locations seeing UN peacekeeping deployment in nine countries in Africa from 2000 to 2011. A host-government has several strategic incentives to influence locations seeing peacekeeping deployments. I focus on one incentive: whether the host-government has an incentive to influence local peacekeeping deployment to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups or co-ethnics of the government. I hypothesise that the host-government will favour protection of its co-ethnics from rebel groups, and thus deployment of UN peacekeepers to its own territories. I also present an alternative hypothesis: that the host-government has incentives to deploy peacekeepers to ethnic constituencies of rebel territories to avoid being monitored and controlled in its own territory. I find that UN peacekeepers are deployed more often, for a longer time, and in greater size to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than of the government. Moreover, when controlling for strategic, deliberate attacks on civilians by the government and rebel groups, the UN remains less likely to deploy to government co-ethnic constituencies than ethnic constituencies of rebel groups. I conclude that host-governments, on average, influence the location of UN peacekeeping troops to rebel co-ethnic constituencies.

Previous research does not account for the strategic interest and ability of host-governments to influence local peacekeeping deployment, and in turn peacekeepers' efficacy. Previous research finds robust results for peacekeeping deploy-

ment along geographical factors such as borders, road networks, and population density as well as previous violence on civilians (Villa and Nomikos 2021; Fjelde et. al 2019, Ruggeri et. al 2016, Townson and Reeder 2014). This thesis aims to fill a significant gap in the literature by theoretically accounting for incentives by the host-government and systematically testing one incentive along co-ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the host-government. Peacekeepers are effective in the geographical locations they are deployed. It is, then, crucial to understand where peacekeepers go to understand the efficacy of peacekeepers in the field. Previous research finds that UN peacekeeping missions are effective in their mandate implementation: they reduce both the intensity (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014), the duration (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017), and geographical scope (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015) of conflict at a local level. Further, when peacekeepers are deployed in support of negotiated settlements they contribute to peace stabilisation (Caplan and Hoeffler, 2017). However, when studies disaggregate the local effect of peacekeeping dependent on actors, the UN is only effective at deterring violence by rebel groups and has no effect on deterring violence by the host-government (Nomikos, Sener and William 2021; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020, Fjelde and Hultman 2019). I argue that the efficacy of peacekeepers influences a host-government location-preference for peacekeeping deployment. This thesis thus fills a significant gap in the literature by illustrating that peacekeepers are simply deployed less, in the first place, to locations where the government has an incentive to commit violence with peacekeepers present.

In this thesis, I lay out a theoretical framework on the incentives and constraints of the UN and host-governments for their geographical preference for peacekeeping deployment. The UN is incentivized to fulfill its vast mandate for peace, but is restricted with limited resources and backlashes from reporting on the host-government. In practice, maintaining government consent represents one

of the greatest challenges to the success of peacekeeping missions. The host-government has incentives to deploy peacekeeping missions to locations where it can yield military benefits, but avoid costs associated with UN presence such as being monitored and reported for crimes. The host-government is restricted in its influence on peacekeeping deployment by having signed status of force-agreements (SOFA) granting the UN freedom of movement, and in maintaining credibility in its constituencies. Second, I lay out mechanisms for how the host-government can influence local UN peacekeeping deployment explicitly through putting up physical barriers and checkpoints, and implicitly when the UN does strategic backward induction to avoid costs associated with government interference when strategic goals misalign. The strategic goals of the government and peacekeepers can misalign when the UN reports on human rights abuses committed by the government, when the UN protects civilians from government inflicted violence, or when the UN deploys to areas where the host-government has strategic interests in the war.

To test the effect of ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the government on local UN peacekeeping deployment, I deploy statistical analysis of nine African countries seeing UN peacekeeping missions from 2000 to 2011. I rely on monthly, sub-national data on peacekeeping onset, presence and number of peacekeeping troops as my dependent variable. Further, I rely on ethnic settlement patterns of groups associated with the government or rebel groups, as well as violence by rebel groups and the government to detangle where peacekeepers go. I robustness test with different operationalisation of my variables, and fixed effects. My results hold: irregardless of previous violence, peacekeepers are deployed more often, for a longer period of time, and in greater numbers to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than of the host-government.

This thesis does not come without limitations. Firstly, this is the first at-



tempt in the peacekeeping literature at statistically analysing the effect of the host-government on local UN peacekeeping deployment. While I establish strong relationships between peacekeeping deployment and rebel group ethnic constituencies, further research is needed to map strategic interests by the host-government. Beyond ethnic constituencies, the host-government is likely to have other incentives such as economic interest as well as incentives that change over time for example under elections, or when belligerent parties gain or lose power in the field. Further, my research does not capture how politically relevant ethnic groups change in civilian support and affiliation over a year, and relies on a strong rally-around-the-flag effect for ethnic identities in conflict time.

This thesis proceeds as follow. First, I lay out the existing literature on peacekeeping deployment and efficacy. Second, I lay out a theoretical framework for incentives and constraints for the UN and the host-government for local peacekeeping deployment. In turn, I introduce methods for how the host-government explicitly and implicitly influences local peacekeeping deployment. I then hypothesise that UN peacekeepers are either deployed to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups or the government. Third, I test my results using statistical analysis. Fourth, I present my results. Finally, I leave concluding remarks.

## 2 | Literature Review

### 2.1 Where Do Peacekeepers Go?

It is crucial to understand where UN peacekeepers go to analyse the efficacy of peacekeepers and improve the protection of people at risk. To deploy a peacekeeping mission, a decision is first made on the national level in the UN Security Council with the UN Secretariat, UN Peacekeeping, troop contributing countries, and the country in question. The decision includes the country of deployment, the mandate of the missions, and the resources allocated such as number of UN personnel, budget, and equipment. Once a peacekeeping mission is approved, it is up to UN Peacekeeping with the host-government to negotiate where peacekeepers deploy locally. Yet, this negotiation remains under-researched in the peacekeeping literature. Understanding *where* and *who* sees peacekeeping deployment is tangent to understanding *where* and *who* UN peacekeeping troops monitor and protect in armed conflict. Research on the national level account for strategic interests of permanent and rotating members in the Security Council for peacekeeping deployment but has left interests of the host-government unaccounted for. Further, on the local level, research has only accounted for the UN's strategic interest in fulfilling its mandate to determine local peacekeeping deployment. This thesis fills a gap in the literature by accounting for strategic interests of the host-government in local peacekeeping deployment to locations where it can protect its civilians and reap military benefits.

#### 2.1.1 National Peacekeeping Deployment

Empirical studies on the national level provide substantive evidence that governments have strategic interests in peacekeeping deployment. One strand of research

finds that members of the UN security council deploy peacekeepers to countries and regions where they will benefit from stability. Another strand of research analyses the severity of conflicts, and find that the UN also deploys to the hardest conflicts. A gap in the research is to account for the strategic interest of the host-government in UN Peacekeeping deployment.

A great depth of research focus on determining which conflicts see UN peacekeeping deployment. On the national level, previous research has looked at particularly two trends: the severity of conflicts, and states' interests. Research finds that the UN tends to intervene in tough and long, ongoing conflicts measured by number of deaths and duration of the war (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna 2004a; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). The UN is hence effective at deploying to violent conflicts, particularly civil wars in the past 20 years. Across research, it is well established that peacekeepers go to hard cases on a national level (Walter, Howard, and Fortna, 2020).

A second factor determining peacekeeping deployment is nation's interest. Beyond violence, an important strand of research analyses the negotiations and incentives behind peacekeeping deployment by members in the Security Council and their strategic interests for peacekeeping deployment to specific countries. Previous research found that the UN deploys to conflicts where the UN Security Council veto-members have national - but not conflicting - interests (Gibbs, 1997). Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) analysed 210 international conflicts from 1945 to 2002 and, in a similar vein, found that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council influence where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed, though severity of conflict is a more important predictor (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Building on this, recent studies find that rotating members in the presidential seat of the Security Council also use their power to send more peacekeepers to their preferred location, specifically in Africa (Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020).

Looking at monthly observations of UN peacekeeping deployment between 1989 to 2014, Carnegie and Mikulaschek (2020, 816) find that when the UN Security Council has an African country in presidency, it was over five times more likely to authorize an increase rather than a decrease in the number of UN peacekeeping troops to a civil conflict in its region. Together with the severity of conflict, a growing literature finds that the strategic interest of states influence which conflicts see peacekeeping deployment.

Whereas states in the Security Council are recognised for having strategic interests and influence over peacekeeping deployment, the strategic interest and influence of a host-government is rarely accounted for on the national level. In the literature, a government accepting a UN peacekeeping mission is presented as a costly signal that the host-government will act in line with the peace process in the long term (Fortna 2004, Ari and Gizelis 2020). Accepting a peacekeeping mission is hence a credible way by the government to handle the commitment problem to peace processes with rebel groups. It is a costly and credible signal for peace. Previous research finds that states with strong military capabilities signal resolve through their capabilities and are less reliant on support by the UN (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). On average, peacekeeping missions are less deployed to violent conflicts involving states with strong military power than to states with weak state capacity (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). The UN is thus deployed to violent conflict in states with weak military capabilities. To reliably commit to peace without strong military capabilities, the state accepts a UN peacekeeping mission. However, a deployment-problem arises when a UN supported peace process alters capabilities of the state; the commitment problem again arises as parties are incentivized to breach the commitment made (Powell, 2006). Understanding how the incentives of a host-government in a conflict interact with peacekeeping deployment is key to understanding UN peacekeeping deployment, and in turn its

efficacy.

When the UN Security Council wish to deploy peacekeeping forces to a conflict, the Security Council needs consent from the government of the country in question. The consent is key, as without it the UN becomes an active party in the conflict. To establish a peacekeeping mission in a country, the Security Council, the peacekeeping mission, and the government of the country must negotiate the Statement of Armed Forces (SOFA). This agreement answers the where, the who, and the when, of peacekeeping deployment including details on arms, costs of fuel, and entry to the country. The SOFA agreement is hence the core guideline between the UN and the host-government to allow for a peacekeeping mission to operate in the country. To end a peacekeeping mission, it is the same key actors who have a say. Outside of the UN and P5-veto members, the host-government is thus the key actor to end a peacekeeping operation. Yet, the role of the host-government remains almost unaccounted for in research when answering, ‘where do peacekeepers go?’.

To understand where peacekeepers go, this thesis aims to fill a gap in the literature by accounting for the role of the host-government in peacekeeping deployment. To understand the role of the host-government in UN peacekeeping deployment, sub-national deployment can reveal host-government interests for deployment. While some interests can be observed at the national level - such as delaying visas or import of goods - the local level sees a larger number of interaction. By the very nature of civil wars, peacekeeping missions deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. With contested state-authority, peacekeepers and the host-government constantly negotiate the content of the SOFA and peacekeepers permission in the country, often resulting in tensions between the state and peacekeepers (Zimmermann, 2020). To actually understand where peacekeepers go, it is hence crucial to analyse peacekeeping deployment at the local level to account

for state actors' incentives to use peacekeeping development strategically.

### **2.1.2 Local Peacekeeping Deployment**

Empirical studies on the local level provide substantive evidence that UN peacekeepers deploy to locations seeing violence. One strand of research find that the UN also deploys to geographical factors associated with potential violence such as borders and populated areas. With UN's limited resources, a second strand of research finds that the UN priorities deploying to areas accessible by road. In contrast to research on the national level, research on the local level is yet to account for the influence of actor's strategic interests on local peacekeeping deployment.

To understand factors impacting where peacekeepers go, it is essential to conduct theory and analysis on the sub-national level. While the decision to deploy a UN Peacekeeping Missions to a country is decided in New York, the decision to deploy to local locations is continuously made on the ground by UN peacekeeping officers, accounting for costs, risks, and benefits. Due to limited resources, the UN officers constantly do cost-benefit analysis to determine where they can most effectively implement its mandates.

A growing number of studies have looked at factors influencing peacekeeping deployment at the local level. Using sub-national analysis, researchers have reached consensus on three key variables influencing which locations see peacekeeping deployment locally: convenient access to the location, populated areas, and past violence (Walter, 2020). Firstly, when the UN Security Council decides to send peacekeepers, they also decide the number of troops and resources the mission initially will be granted. Because resources are limited, several studies have looked at 'convenience' as a factor influencing peacekeeping deployment. 'Convenience' is established by factors such as good road access, short travel time,

and easily navigable terrain (Cil et. al 2020, Ruggeri et. al 2016, Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Based on arguments of convenience, efficiency, and exit strategies, peacekeepers are found to cluster around transportation networks (Cil et. al 2020; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). In these locations, the UN can quickly deploy and withdraw peacekeeping troops and thus cost-efficiently implement its vast mandates.

Second, the UN is found to cluster its deployment around densely populated areas across peacekeeping missions (Cil et. al 2020; Ruggeri et. al. 2016; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Since 2000, peacekeeping missions with robust mandates are mandates to protect civilian at risk from violence. Research finds that populated areas are at higher risk of violence, for example there is an increased risk of conflict when population growth is interacted with population density (Urdal, 2011). A UN peacekeeping mission thus has an incentive to deploy to densely populated areas to deter, prevent, and protect civilians from direct, deliberate attacks.

Lastly, there is a consensus that peacekeepers are deployed where violence is lingering or occurring, particularly when it is threatening the life of civilians. On the sub-national level, studies find that peacekeepers are deployed on the frontline of violence (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, 2016; Walter et. al 2020). Moreover, UN peacekeepers are overall sent to more difficult locations in terms of violence (Hegre, Hultman and Nygaard, 2018). Yet, belligerent parties in civil wars have different incentives to target civilians and the UN can thus have different incentives to deploy troops accordingly.

Recent research has disaggregated violence by actors to determine where peacekeepers go. Analysing the Democratic Republic of Congo, Townsen and Reeder (2014) find that UN peacekeeping troops are rarely deployed to areas

where rebels are fighting rebels. Rather, the UN deploy to areas where the government or rebel groups are targeting civilians, or where the government and rebel groups are attacking each other. However, when studies separate violence conducted by rebel groups and government actors on civilians - large N research finds that the UN only deploy troops as a response to violence committed by rebel groups - not by government forces. Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson (2019) analyse all peacekeeping missions with a mandate to protect civilians in Africa from 2000 to 2014 and find that the UN deployed to areas seeing direct, deliberate attacks by rebel groups, but not by the government. This deployment pattern remains under-researched and under-theorized. Research does not further discuss or analyse factors which explain the unequal treatment in the deployment itself as a response to violence by different actors. Of the 446 instances in which more than 5 civilians were deliberately killed by government or rebel actors, the UN was only deployed in 17 cases - all as a response to attacks by rebel groups (Fjelde et al. 2019). The question is thus if there are structural effects preventing UN Peacekeeping troops from deploying to the 137 cases of one-sided-violence by the host-government and the other attacks by rebel groups.

It is crucial to understand if a host-government can impact local peacekeeping deployment away from areas in which it has strategic interest in civil war. Such an interference will greatly impact the UN's ability to efficiently implement its mandate impartially, including protecting civilians equally from one-sided violence. My thesis aims to fill the respective gap in the literature by analysing the effect of ethno-political affiliation of civilians on local peacekeeping deployment. A limitation in previous theorisation is substantially accounting for how a host-government can influence UN peacekeeping deployment according to its strategic preferences. This thesis aims to fill this knowledge gap by empirically testing whether peacekeepers indeed are deployed impartially to areas of the government



and areas of the rebel group.

## **2.2 What Do Peacekeepers Do?**

Empirical studies on both the national and local level provide substantial evidence for positive effects of UN peacekeepers. Yet, research finds that peacekeepers only are effective at curbing violence by rebel groups, but not by the government. Empirical studies measuring peacekeeping effectiveness face the problem of non-randomness of locations with peacekeeping deployment. Understanding which factors influence the initial peacekeeping deployment is essential to understand the efficacy of UN peacekeeping missions. While studies account for previous violence, the interest and influence of the host-government on peacekeeping deployment is unaccounted for. I argue that the *expected effects* of local UN peacekeeping presence influence the location-preference for host-governments. In turn, the influence of the host-government on peacekeeping deployment can explain the UN's efficacy, including its inability to protect civilians against the government.

### **2.2.1 Consequence of Local Peacekeeping Deployment**

Previous research finds that mechanisms through which peacekeepers are effective at curbing violence are dependent on physical presence or proximity (Cil et al 2020; Nomikos, Sener, and Williams, 2021). Yet, most research in the field has focused on the effectiveness of peacekeeping deployment only - given that the UN already is present. This does not account for the full picture. Knowing the expected effect of UN peacekeepers' presence, I argue that the host-government has strategic incentives to influence which locations see UN peacekeeping troops. In turn, the host-government attempts to influence where and for whom peacekeepers are effective.

When UN peacekeeping troops are present, it is in general found to have large, and positive impacts. The literature has identified three pathways through which UN peacekeeping missions are effective. First, peacekeeping missions can prevent conflict from breaking out again. Maintaining peace was the initial intention of peacekeeping missions, and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find that the UN is effective at doing so measured in two, five, and ten years after the conflict. Fortna (2004, 2008:125) finds that the presence of a peacekeeping mission leads the chances of war to drop by up to 85%.

A second way peacekeepers are effective is through limiting the spatial contagion of armed conflict (Hegre et. al 2019). Beardsley (2011) finds that peacekeepers are effective at reducing the likelihood of conflict onset in neighbouring countries, an effect demonstrated by Kathman and Wood (2011) in previous studies.

A third way peacekeepers are effective is through ceasing fighting and reducing the levels of violence in an armed conflict. For example, the presence of UN peacekeepers increases the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements (Maekawa, Ari and Gizelis, 2019) and contributes to the durability of peace (Fortna 2004; Hultman et. al. 2016; Mac, Joshi, and Lee 2019). Locations seeing UN peacekeepers also report less deliberate targeting of civilians and reduced intensity of violence between belligerent parties (Fjelde and Hultman, 2019). In conclusion, peacekeepers show a beneficial effect for both intensity, duration, recurrence, and diffusion of conflict (Hegre, Hultman, Nygaard, 2019).

Previous research highlights the pathways and mechanisms through which peacekeeping missions are effective at executing their mandates (Howard, 2019). The theoretical argument which explains the effectiveness of peacekeeping is that the presence of peacekeeping increases the cost of fighting, reduces commitment

problems, and facilitates the flow of information between the parties (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017). The presence of UN peacekeeping troops increases the military cost of targeting civilians (Fortna 2008; Fjelde et. al 2019). Peacekeeping troops can establish buffer zones in conflict settings which prevents armed groups from accessing and attacking civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2020). Physically present, the UN can also defend civilians by directly intervening in attacks by armed groups (Fjelde et. al 2019). The more peacekeeping troops present, the larger is the deterrent effect and the ability to directly protect civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2020).

In recent studies, however, the UN's ability to reduce levels of violence has been challenged. When looking at violence on civilians regardless of the perpetrator, more than a dozen quantitative studies find that UN peacekeeping troops protect civilians (Walter et. al 2020, Costalli 2013; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Ruggeri and Di Salvatore 2018; Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2011; Bove and Ruggeri 2016; 2018; Kirschner and Miller 2019; Melander 2009; Phayal and Prins 2020). Yet, when research separates the effect of peacekeeping troops on violence by actors, the results do not hold for violence committed by the government.

Recent research finds that the UN is only effective at protecting civilians against violence committed by the rebel group, not by the government (Fjelde et. al 2019, Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020, Nomikos et.al 2021) . Recent research supports this finding. Deploying a regression discontinuity design between Mali and Burkina Faso, Nomiko et. al (2021) find that peacekeepers only are effective at reducing violence by rebel groups and have no effect on violence by the government. In this regards, previous research points out that third parties like the UN do not know how to bring about stable, peaceful, self-governing states (Fearon, 2017) . Research suggests that third parties lack the capacity (Beardsley,

2008), local know-how (Autesserre, 2015) and legitimacy (Lake, 2015) to prevent violence occurring. Yet, these findings seem unreasonable when not accounting for the influence of the host-government on UN peacekeeping missions.

The peacekeeping literature offers three mechanisms for why peacekeepers are not effective at reducing violence by the government. Firstly, governments may not be deterred by UN peacekeepers because the government holds substantial leverage over peacekeeping operations by being the consent-granting actor for deployment (Nomikos et. al, 2021). Second, because the cost imposed by the UN is higher for rebel groups than governments, armed actors affiliated with the government can be emboldened to perpetrate violence with impunity (Nomikos and Villa, 2022). Lastly, the governments can hinder peacekeeping troops from carrying out their duties by steering them away from the violence (Fjelde et. al 2019). Yet, the last mechanism: that the government steers the UN away from locations where it has strategic interests is under-researched. It is crucial to understand if and how the government can influence peacekeeping deployment to further understand its efficacy. This thesis aims to fill this research gap by analysing whether the government systematically prevents peacekeepers' access to strategic territories in peacekeeping deployment.

## **2.3 Host Government Consent and UN Peacekeeping Missions**

To analyse where peacekeepers go and what peacekeepers do, it is crucial to account for actors' interests and influence on peacekeeping deployment. In this thesis, I account for two: the UN peacekeeping mission and the host-government. Most likely, other actors also influence the locations of peacekeeping deployment,

such as troop contributing countries, which is unaccounted for in the literature. This thesis is a first attempt to map one actor's interests. The host-government can influence UN peacekeepers through being the consent grantor of the peacekeeping mission.

A key aspect - and challenge - for UN Peacekeeping Missions is to maintain host-government consent to remain deployed in a country while fulfilling its mandate impartially. UN Peacekeeping Operations follow three key principles when deploying a mission (UN Peacekeeping, 2020): consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

Without host-government consent, the UN risks becoming a third party to the conflict and face legal difficulties. Thus in practice, the UN Security Council treats the host-government as the key grantor of consent and does not consult other parties extensively for consent (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). The influence of the host-government on a peacekeeping mission is grounded in the founding principle of the UN where governments have the sovereign right to control its territory. In the first paragraph of the UN charter, it says that 'the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members'. Historically, UN peacekeeping missions have only left a country when a host-government has withdrawn consent - not when other parties have done the same (Ibid). Less is known about whether UN peacekeeping missions have exited a country every time a host-government has withdrawn its consent. In the case of Ivory Coast after elections disputes in 2010, the UN with support from the international community deemed the consent-withdrawal as illegitimate by the lame-duck president, and recognised the election winner as the president and thus the host-government. To avoid becoming a party to the conflict and respect the sovereign right of a country, the UN tends to withdraw when the 'legitimate' host-government withdraws its consent.

To deploy a peacekeeping mission, the UN secretariat, the UN Security Council, and the host-government negotiates the Status of Force Agreements (SOFA). De jure consent by the host-government to welcome a peacekeeping mission is laid out in the SOFA agreement. This agreement answers the where, the who, and when of peacekeeping deployment including details on arms, costs of fuel, and entry to the country. The SOFA is agreed between the host-state and the UN through a series of negotiations during the Mission's deployment. The Model SOFA is used prior to reaching an agreement with the host-state. The Model SOFA was created by the UN Secretary-General in 1990. It is the model for the mission-specific SOFAs that are agreed between the UN and a host-government following the mandating of a UN peacekeeping operation (Sheeran, 2011). The agreement regulates the legal relationship between a UN peacekeeping mission and the host government, setting out the rights, obligations, and duties between the two.

The consent between the UN and the host-government is however not static but in constant flux - a moving target. Responding to dynamic changes, the host-government can fully withdraw consent or breach the initial agreement by preventing UN peacekeepers freedom of movement to certain places. While the consent from the host-government is laid out in the SOFA agreement, host-governments can prevent peacekeepers from implementing mandates by obstructing peacekeepers' movements or activities. This can occur when 'a government's interests' conflict with peacekeeping activities such as supporting the implementation of a peace agreement on which the government wishes to renege, reporting on human rights abuses perpetrated by government actors, intervening against wrongdoers with government connections, or protecting civilians from government-inflicted violence,' Sofia Sebastian and Aditi Gorur find (2018).

There is no systematic research within international relations looking at the influence of the host-government on peacekeeping deployment and consent. Yet

the former spokesperson for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur in Sudan (UN-AMID) - Aicha Al-Basri - notes that the Khartoum government repeatedly denied peacekeepers access to contested areas (Fjelde et. al, 2019). Further, Sudanese authorities also prevented peacekeepers from making inquiries into bombing campaigns by the Sudanese government (Lynch, 2014). ‘In every mission there is a tension between the necessity to preserve the consent and good will of the host government required to allow our peacekeepers to do their jobs and the sometimes contradictory imperative to report accurately and candidly on any and all incidents of violence,’ wrote the UN’s previous peacekeeping official (Ibid). The role of the host-government as an active and contested actor in a civil war - but also the legitimate authority on the international stage - represents a great and under-researched challenge for peacekeeping deployment.

While the host-government can execute explicit influence on UN peacekeeping deployment, the UN’s interest and necessity to preserve collaborative relations and consent from the host-government can implicitly impact While the government can exp

### 3 | Theoretical Argument

I argue that a UN peacekeeping mission and a host-government have different preferences for local peacekeeping deployment. For the UN, this involves locations where it can fulfill its robust mandates as efficiently and thoroughly as possible. The UN is thus incentivised to deploy to locations with conflict and populated areas. For the host-government, its incentives involves remaining strengthened in government and maintaining sovereignty of its territory. The host-government is thus incentivised to deploy peacekeepers to locations with civilian government supporters, and contested territories by rebel groups to establish legitimacy. However, both actors are constrained in their preferences. The UN is constrained by limited resources and the risk of retaliation by a displeased host-government. The host-government is constrained by the SOFA allowing the UN freedom of movement, and the risk of reputation costs at home if perceived as undermining the peace process.

To influence local peacekeeping deployment, I argue that the host-government firstly can threaten to withdraw its consent for a peacekeeping mission. Second, the host-government can stop collaborating with the UN and in turn diminish the UN's diplomatic space. Lastly, the host-government can actively work to influence peacekeeping deployment by limiting the UN's freedom of movement through checkpoints and road blockades. Through strategic backward induction, the UN in turn can implicitly be influenced by avoiding areas where it is likely to be confronted with the host-government. The UN can also be explicitly influenced by the host-government through blockades and checkpoints. Because ethnic group identities often strengthen during armed conflict and civilians are a crucial resource, I in turn hypothesize that peacekeepers are deployed differently to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the government regardless of previous



violence. While a host-government has several strategic incentives for peacekeeping deployment, this thesis aims to test one of them.

### **3.1 Incentives and Constraints by the UN**

I argue that the UN is incentivised to deploy to locations where it can prevent and respond to violence and in turn fulfil its diverse mandates. UN peacekeepers mandates include protecting civilians, provide public goods, and report human rights abuses in the field. Yet, with limited resources and dependency on government-collaboration, peacekeepers must strategically deploy to locations where it can be the most successful. In turn, UN peacekeepers balance impartiality and maintain host-government consent in its peacekeeping deployment.

#### **3.1.1 UN Incentives**

The UN has diverse mandates to fulfil in the field. The UN is firstly incentivised to be where the violence is occurring to deter, intervene, report, and monitor the conflict. One of the key mandates is particularly to protect civilians from deliberate, targeted attacks by all sides in the conflict. In the Handbook for Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (United Nations Department of Peace Operations, 2020), four phases to protect civilians are laid out which in turn lay out the incentives for peacekeeping deployment.

Firstly, peacekeepers seek to prevent spirals that can lead to violent clashes in the first place through deterrence. This includes ‘ensuring a visible presence of UN military and police components, particularly in areas at risk where the state security forces are not present, by: assuring the population of the mission’s intent to protect them from physical violence; and establishing community engagement and alert mechanisms’ (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020;

139 in Nomikos and Villa 2022). To maintain visibility for as many people as possible to deter violence, the UN is incentivised to be in more populated areas. Further, the UN has an incentive to be deployed to populate areas with high risk of violence. Raleigh and Hegre (2009) find that conflicts happen in frequency to the proportion size of the population, particularly where population clusters locally. Previous research finds that populated areas are considered to be of higher security threat, and are therefore likely to see the deployment of UN peacekeepers in a civil war (Urdal, 2011),

Secondly, once threats of violence are detected, the UN is mandated to preempt violence. In this phase, peacekeepers can implement security operations or join with domestic authorities. Security operations ‘can entail credible deterrence actions or engaging in offensive operations to prevent violence against civilians’ (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020; 141 in Nomikos and Villa 2022). The UN hence has an incentive to be deployed to areas with threats of violence.

Thirdly, peacekeepers are mandated to respond once violence plays out to limit its scope. Here, the UN is mandated to use force ‘in accordance with the military ROE (rules of engagement) and the police DUF (Directives on Detention, Searches and Use of Force), including to apprehend and temporarily detain hostile persons or groups and, where appropriate, hand them over to the national authorities’ (United Nations Department of Peace Operations 2020; 141 in Nomikos and Villa 2022). Once the violence is deterred, peacekeepers are mandated to cooperate with the local authorities to maintain the protection of civilians. As such, it is key for the UN to maintain good relationships with local authorities to access and prevent violence.

Peacekeeping missions with robust mandates are also asked to provide state

functions to the population where they are deployed (Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2013). A common train in civil wars seeing peacekeeping missions is weak state capacity. States with weak state capacity often struggle to provide for civilian's safety, implement law enforcement, provide public goods, and infrastructure (Ruggeri et. al 2016). Peacekeepers thus have an incentive to operate where the central government is not present and has limited reach to curb violence.

Lastly, the UN has an incentive to deploy peacekeeping troops to areas where it can implement its mandates in a cost and risk efficient way. Because the UN has limited resources given at the start of the mission, the UN constantly does cost-benefit analysis. The UN therefore has an incentive to deploy to accessible areas where it can have exit-strategies. Peacekeeping activities are more effectively enabled when the UN can easily patrol large territories (Cil et. al 2020). In line with previous research, the UN hence has an incentive to deploy to areas with transportation networks, communication networks, and densely populated areas. Since populated areas are at higher risk of violence, the UN can be more effective at curbing violence, reporting crimes, and having a deterrent effect in populated areas.

### **3.1.2 UN Constraints**

While there are many locations a UN peacekeeping mission ideally would like to deploy, there are constraints. The first constraint the UN meets in the field is that of inconvenience. The logic introduced is two-folded. Firstly, the UN has limited resources and hence aims to utilize its resources to be as effective and responsive as possible. For example, there are more than 17,000 troops deployed through MONUSCO in the DRC, but these troops are mandated to protect 82 million people spread out over more than 2.3 million square kilometres (UN, 2022). As such, the UN has to prioritize responding to events where it believes it can effectively

decrease violence and provide security.

Second, the UN is risk averse with pressure from troop contributing countries and the UN bureaucratic system and thus needs to have an exit plan (Bove and Ruggeri, 2015). The key challenge peacekeepers face in a high-risk environment is the logistics of moving sizable troops to remote regions of a country (Haass and Ansborg, 2018). When there are no functioning streets or railways, military equipment such as planes and helicopters are needed to deploy troops to remote areas (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, 2016). However, numerous reports documents that the UN does not receive the number of helicopters or resources necessary to respond with sizable troops to remote locations experiencing violence (Office of Military Affairs, DPO, 2021). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Financial Service (DFS), and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) all support and facilitate the movement of peacekeeping deployments within a country which introduces bureaucratic constraints on where the UN can go (Ruggeri et al., 2016). As such, a UN Peacekeeping mission constantly needs to do a cost-benefit analysis before deploying troops to a new location.

The third constraint the UN meets is grounded in the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. It is key for the UN to maintain host-government consent to operate and move within the country - without consent the peacekeeping operations risks becoming a third party to the conflict. Notwithstanding, the UN needs to establish and maintain good relations with both parties in the armed conflict to not become a political target in the conflict. However, the UN is also mandated to respond impartially to all acts of violence: they are encouraged to avoid activities that might compromise the image of impartiality (UN Peacekeeping, 2022). Failure to remain impartial,

the UN states, will undermine the operation's legitimacy and credibility, and can lead to the withdrawal of consent by one or more parties. However, in practice, the UN treats the host-government as the key grantor of consent and does not consult other parties extensively for consent (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). This is because the host-government is the main sovereign power, and has the strongest military capabilities to retaliate against the UN. While the UN ideally would like to respond equally to all reports of violence, in practice the UN has to strategically evaluate possible retaliations from such an action. On the one side the UN is risking being seen as impartial by the rebel group, on the other side the UN is risking deteriorated cooperation from the host-government. Absence of host-government consent makes it an extremely high-risk environment. The UN constraint for peacekeeping deployment preferences is hence to balance government preferences with its mandate to respond impartially to areas of risk and with violence.

### **3.2 Incentives & Constraints by the Host-Government**

I argue that the host-government has incentives to deploy UN peacekeeping troops along ethnic constituencies of the government and rebel groups. Ethnic identities work as pre-existing social networks, facilitating the detection of supporters and opposition. The host-government is incentivised to deploy peacekeepers to location where it can protect its co-ethnics from violence, and in turn, strengthen its civilian support. Further, the host-government has incentives to avoid peacekeeping deployment to locations where it has strategic interest in using violence. The host-government is constrained in its peacekeeping deployment preference because it is costly both internationally and locally to be perceived negatively in the peace process, specifically through breaching the SOFA agreement.

### 3.2.1 Host-Government Incentives

The host-government has incentives to deploy UN peacekeeping troops to locations where it militarily benefit, while avoid deployment to locations where the UN can impose costs on the host-government. Firstly, the host-government has an incentive to deploy UN peacekeepers to locations where the government has civilian supporters to gain protection from rebel groups, and avoid increased costs imposed by the UN associated with government violence in rebel constituencies. The mechanism is two-folded: firstly, the government has an incentive to utilize the UN to gain protection from rebel attacks on its civilian population. Extensive literature has found that rebel groups target civilians for reasons including gaining access to resources, increased bargaining power, to gain civilian cooperation, or for ethnic cohesion (see Wood 2016 for extensive overview). The support and cooperation of the civilian population is crucial for the success of parties in the armed conflict, which is also why they are a strategic target in warfare (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006). In addition to being a potential pool for military recruitment, civilians can offer logistical support, food, shelter, weapons, as well as income through taxes. Civilians are key informants who can report on developments in the war such as movement of troops or equipment (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003).

The host-government has a strategic advantage if they maintain civilian cooperation and support in civil war. Further, in a post-conflict environment, civilian support is key for the host-government to remain in power if elections are introduced. Protection of civilian lives is key to obtain and sustain civilian cooperation for the government, but it is a costly affair. The presence of UN peacekeeping troops in government co-ethnic constituencies will increase the cost of rebels targeting government co-ethnic civilians, which benefits government sup-

port and rule. Empirical evidence shows that the government generates more support among co-ethnic than non-co-ethnic civilians due to common culture, language, and dense social networks with higher trust and information flows (Beiser-McGrath, Muller-Crepon and Pengl 2021; Bormann 2019; Adida 2017)

Secondly, the government has an incentive to obstruct the deployment of UN peacekeepers to constituencies where the host-government has incentives to commit deliberate attack on civilians. Governments also target civilians in civil wars. The reasons include to punish civilian opposition (Valentino et.al 2004), annex strategic land held by civilians and gain valuable resources (Downes 2011) or decrease the rebel's ability to hide among the civilian population (Azam and Hoeffler 2002). In turn, civilians are targeted to give the party an upper hand in the conflict. However, targeting civilians is also a costly affair for the government with the UN present. The UN can both directly intervene in the violence, or report the violence to the UN headquarters which increases reputation costs and the risk of international retaliations. The government therefore has an incentive to utilize the troops for its supporters' protection, and reduce the cost associated violence in ethnic constituencies of rebel groups.

The government has an incentive to prefer peacekeeping deployment along ethnic lines according to co-ethnics of the government and co-ethnics of the rebel group (Wucherpfenning et al. 2012, Horowitz 1985). Ethnic groups are formed along individuals with a common language, phenotypes, and common cultural traditions (Beiser-McGrath et. al 2021). To determine if civilians are supporters of the government or a rebel group, ethnicity becomes an elevated social network in armed conflict. Several qualitative and single case studies emphasize the crucial role of ethnicity in accounting for patterns of wartime civilian abuse (see e.g., Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Kaldor 2001; Kaufman 2006; Sullivan 2012). Popular accounts of civilian atrocities for example from Darfur and the Nuba mountains

in Sudan, or the conflict in Burundi, testify to the salience of ethnic divisions for strategic purposes (see e.g., Human Rights Watch 2003, 2004, 2012). Fjelde and Hultman (2014; 1233) find across civil conflicts in Africa the government is likely to target civilians in rebel co-ethnic constituencies, and rebel groups are likely to target civilians in government co-ethnic constituencies.

Fjelde and Hultman (2014) argues that the ‘same mechanisms that facilitate mobilization within intra-ethnic networks also create strategic incentives for warring actors to engage in collective targeting of the rival’s ethnic support base’. They map five mechanisms in the literature through which a party can mobilize the civilian population along ethnic lines in a civil war. I argue that this mechanism influences the government’s incentive for peacekeeping deployment to government co-ethnic constituencies and not ethnic constituencies of rebel groups.

Firstly, pre-existing social networks with shared collective identities are important determinants for civilian support (Kalyvas 2006, 95). Ethnicity is often a proxy for a pre-existing social network because common language, frequent contact, and cultural similarities make within-group mobilization less costly and establish higher levels of trust (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).

Secondly, it is easier to deter free riders, punish nonparticipation, and police group boundaries along ethnic coalitions due the ascriptive nature of ethnicity (Eck 2009). Thirdly, within an ethnic network one can offer social rewards, create moral commitment, and a sense of solidarity which strengthen the parties’ support in the civilian population (Weinstein 2007). Fourthly, mobilization along ethnic lines in the civilian population can be facilitated when a group shares common political preferences and grievances (Horowitz 1985; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).



And lastly, in Sub-Saharan Africa ethnic groups tend to cluster geographically which makes it advantageous for warring groups to mobilize civilians across this social network in armed conflict (Scarritt and McMillan 1995; Weidmann 2009). As such, the government has a strategic incentive to utilize UN peacekeepers for protection in government co-ethnic areas while being able to strategically target civilians in co-ethnic rebel constituencies, though without the presence of the UN.

### **3.2.2 Host-Government Constraints**

The UN's principle of impartiality is a key constraint for host-government influence on peacekeeping deployment. Impartiality limits the host-government's room for negotiation and influence over UN peacekeeping deployment. While the host-government is the key consent grantor for a peacekeeping mission, the host-government has substantial constraints in negotiations with the UN. When the host-government accepts a peacekeeping mission, they also sign the status of force agreement (SOFA) with the UN Security Council and UN Peacekeeping. This is the core agreement between the UN and the host-government. Among a range of liberties in this agreement, the host-government grants UN freedom of movement in the country. As power dynamics change in the field the government has incentives to breach its initial agreement to gain benefits on the ground. However, any attempt of the host-government at restricting UN's freedom of movement is thus a breach of their agreement.

Breaching agreements can be costly for the host-government: the UN has the power to increase reputation costs, member states can impose sanctions or penalties, and the UN can ultimately withdraw the peacekeeping mission. While the host-government is the key grantor of consent and can gain benefits from the peacekeeping mission, they also need to maintain the goodwill of the UN and the Security Council. As such, the host-government is greatly constrained in its pref-

erences. The host-government does not want strong penalties from the UN and the international community for breaching its initial agreement. The host-government thus has to navigate ways to breach its initial promise of freedom of movement while avoiding costs associated with the breach. Recently, several peacekeeping missions got mandated to map local breaches of the SOFA agreements by the host-government. In a nine-month period from March to November 2015, the mission in South Sudan reported 450 violations by the host-government on UN access to territories at risk (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). When the UN systematically map breaches, the host-government faces diplomatic costs and pressure to adhere to its promises.

Breaching an agreement to influence UN peacekeeping deployment is not only associated with international costs, but the host-government is also constrained by its reputation at home. Accepting a peacekeeping mission is a costly and credible signal by the host-government for its intent for peace with belligerent groups. If the government is perceived to undermine the peace process, further distrust and grievances can be fuelled internally. The host-government can therefore further lose credibility among its citizens. A constraint by the host-government is thus to influence and negotiate peacekeeping deployment of the UN, while maintaining an image of being conducive to the peace process.

The last constraint for the host-government on its influence on UN peacekeeping deployment can be grounded in internal conflicts. Due to weak state capacity, there can be scenarios where the host-government disagrees on its preferences for UN-peacekeeping deployment and as such struggles to strategically convey its preferences. As such, a constraint for the host-government on local UN peacekeeping is internal conflict. For example, negotiators of the SOFA agreement from the host-government in New York might not have the influence and state-reach to ensure that the agreement is upheld across the country. As such, while there are

incentives in one part of the government to grant the UN access, other parts of the local government can be setting up checkpoints and obstacles for the deployment. In this scenario, the host-government does not operate under one strategy but sees internal conflict impacting its preferences for peacekeeping deployment. In turn, disagreements internally in the host-government is a constraint on their peacekeeping deployment influence.

### **3.3 Mechanisms**

The host-government can implicitly and explicitly influence peacekeeping deployment according to its preferences. Firstly, the host-government can implicitly influence peacekeeping deployment by diminishing collaboration with the UN when discontent. This severely hampers the UN in its mandate implementation, making the UN incentivised to maintain the good-will of the host-government by avoiding such scenarios. Second, if the UN does not conform, the host-government can threaten to withdraw consent for the peacekeeping mission to operate in the country. In turn, the UN can, through backward indication, avoid deploying peacekeepers to locations where it anticipates host-government retaliations. Lastly, the host-government can explicitly influence local UN peacekeeping deployment through setting up checkpoints and barricades, which prevents peacekeepers' access. Due to limited resources and risk-averse decision-making, the UN can rarely break through checkpoints and in turn cannot deploy to the area at the given time.

#### **3.3.1 Host Government: Diminish UN Collaboration**

The host-government has an incentive to signal dissatisfaction with the UN Peacekeeping mission when penalized, such as when the UN reports on human rights abuses by the government, or deploys where the host-government has strategic

interests to use violence against belligerent parties. Because the UN greatly relies on collaboration and full consent by the host-government to execute its mandate, diminished collaboration can greatly undermine UN's efficacy in the field. A deterioration of host-government consent can manifest as political disruptions, where the host government 'seeks to undercut the mission's diplomatic space to the point of rendering the mission irrelevant' (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018: 23).

When there are few entry points to collaborate with the host-government, the UN struggles to implement its mandates. These actions include restricting information to the UN, such as not including the mission in governmental processes or meetings, or putting up bureaucratic obstacles such as making the UN report to the government every time it wishes to move troops. This was seen for example in South Sudan after the civil war broke out in December 2013, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The UN Security Council bolstered a mandate for the peacekeeping mission to respond to violence, but the host-government was not collaborating with the mission; the mission played no role in the new political process; and the mission's role centered around human rights reporting and monitoring as well as protection of civilians. This new mandate further alienated collaborations between the South-Sudanese government and the UN Mission which saw itself unable to execute any of its military and security related mandates successfully (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). The diminishing collaboration by the host-government influences local UN peacekeeping deployment: the UN is incentivised to move peacekeeping troops to maintain the good-will of the host-government and deploy to areas where it can be efficient in implementing its mandates.




Figure 3.1: UN peacekeeping deployment and violence in South Sudan in 2014 across government and rebel co-ethnic constituencies. The map illustrates how the UN was not able to deploy to several locations with one-sided-violence. White territories are settled by political irrelevant ethnic groups. Note that South Sudan is a case where a rebel group co-ethnic also sits in the government. In this study, all ethnic groups with a relationship to rebel groups are coded as rebel groups.

### 3.3.2 Host-Government: Actively Work Against the UN Peacekeeping Mission

Actively working against the UN peacekeeping mission is the most common way a host-government influences peacekeeping operation. Lack of collaboration by the host-government becomes widespread when there is an increase of violence and human rights abuses by the host-government (CIVIC, 2016). This is the time when the peacekeeping mission most needs to be able to respond quickly to events. In South Sudan for example, the mission reported 450 violations of the SOFA agreement in a nine-month period from March to November 2015 which included limited freedom of movement, obstruction of supplies, and visa delays for new

peacekeeping troops and observers (CIVIC, 2016).

To influence UN peacekeeping deployment according to its preferences, the host-government can actively undermine the peacekeeping mission by physically preventing peacekeeper's access to areas of interest and block supplies reaching peacekeepers. In other words, the host-government affects peacekeeping deployment through limiting freedom of movement and actively making it harder for the peacekeeping mission to implement its mandates. By restricting access to an area, the mission loses situational awareness in the field, and the ability to protect civilians under attack at risk from violence.

Limiting UN's freedom of movement or block supplies are direct breaches of the SOFA agreement which the host-government agreed upon when consenting to peacekeeping deployment. Sebastian and Gorur (2018) map the most common violations implemented to influence peacekeeping operations. Firstly, the host government can actively restrict freedom of movement by both land, air, and water to prevent the peacekeeping mission's response to violence on the ground. For example, in Darfur the mission reported that an action against the government always results in retaliation on the UN peacekeeping mission.

Further, in Ivory Coast, the election of December 2010 saw disagreements over the end results which impacted relationships between the peacekeeping mission and the host-government under President Gbagbo (Coulibaly, 2010). President Gbagbo was leaving office but tried to reverse the election result while he still controlled the Constitutional Council. The UN peacekeeping mission, which was also mandated to certify the election process, rejected Gbagbo's claim, and announced Ouattara as the new president (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). This disagreement led to a spiral of violent clashes between supporters of the two presidents (Salazar-Winspear, 2010). The violence further fuelled confrontations be-

tween the challenged host-government and the UN Peacekeeping mission as illustrated in Figure 3.2. As a result, the government under Gbagbo actively worked to restrict movements by the peacekeeping mission to areas seeing violence between the two parties, and blocked the provision of goods to the peacekeeping mission (Lynch, 2011). Eventually, the Gbagbo government withdrew their consent for the peacekeeping mission - an action which in this case was not seen as legitimate when the international society recognised Ouattara as the legitimate head of state after the election. However, this goes to show what power the host-government's consent has over UN peacekeeping missions. If it was not for pressure from the international stage, the UN peacekeeping mission would have had to withdraw (Ibid). The host-government can explicitly influence local peacekeeping deployment by preventing UN's access to areas of interest through military blockades and checkpoints. This mechanism is effective for preventing peacekeeping deployment to an area of interest, but is not effective to influence deployment to areas of interest. This mechanism is a costly affair for the host-government since it comes with high reputation costs on the international and local stage. However, it is an effective way to explicitly influence local peacekeeping deployment since UN missions do not have the resources or the political interest to break through a government military blockade.

### **3.3.3 Host Government: Retract Consent to UN Peacekeeping Mission**

The host government can ultimately threaten to withdraw consent for the UN peacekeeping mission if it is dissatisfied with UN's actions, forcing the mission to leave the country. The host government is the actor of sovereignty on the global stage ruling over its territory. This is crucial. In chapter 1, article 2 of the United Nations it is stated that 'the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign




Figure 3.2: UN peacekeeping deployment and violence in Ivory Coast from December 2010 to May 2011 along ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the government after the December 2010 Election. The election in December did not impact the ethnic settlement data; when a rebel group gains power in government, it is still coded as rebel group in this paper.

equality of all its Members'. Since the host government is the ultimate grantor of consent, it can also threaten to withdraw consent if it is displeased with the UN operations. Whether a host government collaborates or threatens to withdraw consent to a UN peacekeeping mission depends on how 'the mission's activities align with or undermine the government's interests' (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018: 23).

Government consent to host a peacekeeping mission can be retracted at any point, and as such the peacekeeping mission balances fulfilling its mandate while locally negotiating with the government. The UN's ability to fulfil their mandate is affected by the state authority and how their interests, goals, perceptions, and expectations towards the peacekeeping mission stands. If the mission fails to accommodate government protection of its civilians, a mission can be requested to



withdraw by the government. For example, MINURCAT in Chad was deployed in late 2005 as a result of cross-border militia attacks on Chadian civilians and ethnic tensions between local groups. In Chad, the host-government regarded the peacekeeping mission as a buffer zone between the government and rebel groups in border areas (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018:27). This was a mismatch of expectations between the host-government and MINURCAT to begin with because the mission was also mandated to report and monitor violence by the government. When MINURCAT failed to respond to rebel attacks in N'Djamena in both summer of 2008 and fall of 2009, deterioration of host-government consent developed in an already tense relationship (Karlsrud and de Costa, 2013). See the illustration of the peacekeeping deployment and the violence in Figure 3.3. In 2010, the government of Chad did not wish to renew the MINURCAT mandate referring to the UN's insufficiencies in protecting its civilians from rebel groups and fulfilling its mandate with too few UN troops on the grounds (Weir 2010). Rather, the government of Chad believed they would be able to do a better job (Karlsrud and de Costa, 2013). Yet, reports had revealed that specialized Chadian police, who had undergone training by the UN, were involved in serious misconduct. The misconduct included 'the murder of a civilian in Farchana in March 2009, the gross misuse of firearms, and the striking of a refugee in Oure Cassoni' (Weir 2010: 2). The UN's report on the Chadian police, arguably, did not improve the deteriorating relationship with the host-government.

The government's dissatisfaction with UN protection of its civilians, combined with the increased cost imposed by the UN on violence experienced by the Chadian government, led the mission to terminate. A different use of the consent was attempted by the government in Ivory Coast after the election in 2010 where Outtara won presidency. The UN Mission, mandated to verify the election, did not recognise the lame-duck President Gbagbo as head of state after

constitutional changes to remain in power. With violent clashes breaking out over the result, Gbagbo withdrew the consent of UNOCI to operate. However, due to international pressure recognising Ouattara as the legitimate president and government, the UN peacekeeping mission could remain in the country. Without the international pressure however, the UN mission would have had to withdraw. This goes to show how explicitly a host-government can influence UN peacekeeping deployment within its territory.




Figure 3.3: UN peacekeeping deployment and violence in Chad 2008-2009 across ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the government. White areas are inhabited by ethnic groups who are not associated with rebel groups or the government.

### 3.3.4 The UN : A Response to the Host-government

As a response to the host-government influencing peacekeeping deployment, the UN peacekeeping mission must balance consent and impartiality to continue the

peacekeeping operations. The host-government has an explicit and an implicit effects on peacekeeping deployment. Firstly, the host-government can explicitly impact peacekeeping deployment by physically preventing UN peacekeepers' access to territories through blockades and checkpoints. Secondly, the host-government can have an implicit effect on peacekeeping deployment because the UN peacekeeping mission strategically avoids actions that are likely to offset the host-government. The UN does a backward calculation on possible government responses to a deployment, and thus self-censor itself from confrontations with the host-government. The worst-case scenario for the UN peacekeeping operation and the international community is to fully lose the government consent to operate in the country. The calculation is that it is better to fulfil parts of the mandate, than nothing of the mandate. With presence on the ground, the UN can still systematically report and observe events on the ground, as well as be in dialogue with the host-government, belligerent parties, and the civil society.

The host-government can have an implicit effect on UN peacekeeping deployment. As a rational actor, the UN conducts a backward inductive calculation of costs and benefits of possible government responses to its action (Bas et. al 2007). As such, the UN is likely to navigate peacekeeping deployment given how it thinks the host-government is likely to respond. Reports across peacekeeping missions find that the most common way for the UN to respond to the host-government is through 'self-censorship' and 'self-imposed' limitations of movement (CIVIC, 2016; Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). The UN peacekeeping mission will attempt to avoid situations where it comes into confrontation with the host-government in the first place, knowing the possible costs the government can impose. This is an implicit way the host-government hence influences peacekeeping deployment. This tactic often leaves civilians at risk without protection and has the costs that the UN is blamed for impartiality in the field. In an in-depth investigation

of the July 2016 violence in Juba in South-Sudan, Spink and Wells note that ‘the longstanding unwillingness or inability of the UN Security Council and UNMISS to enforce its Status of Forces Agreement with the government meant that, when fighting erupted in July, UNMISS was once again obstructed from moving outside its bases,’ (CIVIC, 2016).

The negotiation-dilemma between the UN peacekeeping mission and the host-government is shaped by the UN balancing consent and impartiality in the field when implementing its mandate. Currently, there are no formal tools for member states or guidance for the mission to handle host-state negotiations in settings of deteriorating consent (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). When the host-government chooses to explicitly influence local peacekeeping deployment with physical barriers and checkpoints by the host-government, the UN peacekeeping mission often calculates that it is not worth the risk and cost to breach the barrier - though it is allowed to do so stated in the SOFA. Through interviews with UN representatives, Sebastian and Gorur (2018: 29) notes that peacekeepers can push through a checkpoint but ‘then you have another checkpoint and civilians back in the camp-site. You need to think about those civilians. Logistically, it is not realistic to push through.’ They note that even when faced with minor opposition to enter through checkpoints, the leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission accepted the restriction and adjusted the operation ‘for the sake of the smooth functioning of the mission,’ though it hampers mandate implementation and credibility in the field. To avoid direct confrontation that increases the risk of an operation, the UN hence follows host-government restriction on access. In this way, the host-government has an explicit effect on local peacekeeping deployment.

There are other mechanisms the UN Peacekeeping missions deploy as a response to host-government involvement in deployment, but these do not overcome the explicit or implicit consequences of the geographical location of peacekeeping




Figure 3.4: UN peacekeeping deployment and violence in Sudan in 2009 across ethnic constituencies of the government and rebel groups. White areas are not associated with rebel groups nor the government.

deployment in the short term. For example, all UN Peacekeeping missions are in recent years mandated to systematically track and report all the SOFA violations in mission-reports to the UN Security Council. Once systematically documented, the SOFA violations are raised diplomatically between the host-government and the Security Council. This reduces the possible retaliation costs on the ground for the peacekeeping mission. Another mechanism is to cooperate with the donor community to the country, particularly in the case of serious human right abuses, which was the case in Sudan (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). For diplomatic tools to work, it needs to be a strategic and collective effort. An observer from the UN noted that ‘you use all the channels that can exert pressure...and identify who will make the most impact. Collaboration and mutual support ... give us the opportunity to get some messages out that we cannot say as the UN,’ (Sebastian and

Gorur, 2018). However, this is rare.

To maintain collaboration with the host-government and avoid counterproductive results, the UN peacekeeping missions tend to solve SOFA violations quietly and bilaterally. In UNMISS, a representative noted that ‘the moment you go through the press and point fingers, it is always going to worsen the situation and put people on the defensive. [Governments] don’t want to lose face,’ (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). As such, the host-government is expected to be likely to influence peacekeeping deployment along its strategic preferences, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.

### 3.4 Hypotheses

Understanding factors impacting the geographical deployment of UN peacekeepers is key for the efficacy of peacekeepers in the field. Peacekeepers have diverse mandates to fulfil and respond to both geographical as well as political obstacles when navigating high risk environments in armed conflicts. Both the UN and the host-government are strategic actors. As such, they conduct strategical backward induction as they navigate relations and actions (Bas et al. 2007). Combining the strategic interest of UN peacekeeping missions to intervene where it can be efficient and cost effective, and the host-government to gain protection of its civilians while avoiding increased costs in belligerent territories, I hypothesize the following will be observed:

*H1: The effect of ethnic constituencies of the government leads to more peacekeeping deployment than the effect of ethnic constituencies of rebel groups.*

An alternative hypothesis lays in my arguments on host-government preferences. Firstly, the host-government can value protection of civilians as less ben-

official than UN peacekeeper monitoring and reporting on the host-government in its own territories. Instead, the host-government has an incentive for the UN to report and monitor on rebel activity to maintain ceasefires, monitor strengths, and provide basic security and public goods in rebel territories (Ruggeri et. al 2016). Keeping in mind that countries seeing peacekeeping deployment often have weak state capacity (2003), the host-government can also have an incentive for the UN to provide public goods and security to curb grievances and the rise of new violence in rebel-controlled territories.

Second, the host-government can have an incentive to use UN peacekeeping troops to strengthen its sovereignty and legitimacy in the periphery of the country. As such, UN peacekeepers can be deployed at border zones (Ruggeri et. al 2016) to both mediate and avoid contestation over territories, often settled by groups who support rebel groups. In recent studies, it is suggested that the host-government thus can reap the military benefits of UN peacekeeping troops on its borders by limiting renewed conflict, holding territory, and establishing security reform (Villa, 2021).

Being stationed in rebel territories can also be advantageous for the UN, as they are likely to be faced with fewer scenarios where they must report government activities in case of human rights violations as the government is absent. It hence might be only a few selected rebel areas where the government does not wish for UN peacekeeping deployment, but that the host-government in general reaps military and social benefits from seeing deployment in territories supporting their adversary. As a counter, one can thus also hypothesis the following:

*H2: The effect of ethnic constituencies of rebel groups leads to more peacekeeping deployment than the effect of ethnic constituencies of the government.*

Lastly, it can be the case that there is no effect of belligerent parties on peace-

keeping deployment. Rather, the UN deployed along other factors. In this scenario, I expect to observe the null hypothesis of the two scenarios presented above: the concentration of peacekeeping forces does not significantly vary across areas by politically relevant ethnic groups. Future research can benefit from interviews to detangle the interests of governments and the UN alike.

The hypothesis builds on both the strategic interests of the UN and the host-government, and on the ability of the host-government to influence UN peacekeeping deployment. Below I lay out the mechanisms through which the host-government can impact UN peacekeeping deployment to its preferred location.



## 4 | Research Design

I test my theory with a large, sub-national dataset on local peacekeeping deployment and co-ethnic constituencies of rebel and government groups in nine African countries from 2000 to 2011. While I expect my theory of government-influence on local peacekeeping to remain relevant in other countries seeing UN peacekeeping deployment, I do not expect my hypotheses on peacekeeping deployment along co-ethnic constituencies to be relevant outside multi-ethnic countries. My models estimate the effect of ethnic constituencies by rebel groups and the government on local UN peacekeeping onset, presence, and number of peacekeeping troops. I use logistic and linear models to enable fixed-effects strategy that controls for spatial and temporal differences. Since previous research has established a relationship between peacekeeping deployment and violence, I run models controlling for previous violence by both rebel groups and the government.

### 4.1 Data

In order to analyse where peacekeepers go, I conduct a disaggregated statistical analysis at the sub-national level of nine countries in Africa. Using grids cells allows me to account for fine-grained dynamics across time and space within a country. In the following section, I aim to detangle one of the strategic interests of the host-government on peacekeeping deployment: to deploy to areas supporting the government or to areas supporting rebel groups. To do so, I conduct a monthly sub-national statistical analysis of all countries in Africa that saw a peacekeeping mission from January 2000 to December 2011 building on the theorization of Fjelde et al. (2019). Running a linear regression on time-series data of the cells with country-fixed effects, I aim to detangle the relationships behind peacekeep-

ers' spatial access during deployment. This leaves me with the following nine countries with their missions in parenthesis: Burundi (ONUB), Central African Republic (MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, MONUSCO), Ivory Coast (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA) illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.




Figure 4.1: UN Peacekeeping deployment in 2008 across ethnic constituencies of the government and rebel groups.

The research is limited to the period starting in 2000 because in 1999 the mandates of peacekeepers changed significantly. The UN Security Council passed the resolution on the protection of civilians (S/RES/1265, 1999) which, for the first time, mandated peacekeepers to take necessary action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Since 2000, Lloyd (2021) finds that all missions in Africa had robust mandates which impact the outcome of peacekeeping missions distinctly in contrast to earlier missions.

For my unit of analysis, I rely on the spatial PRIO-grid structure which divides countries into cells that are 0.5x0.5 degrees latitude/longitude, corresponding to approximately 55x55 km at the equator (Tollefsen, 2012). This spatial unit allows for sub-national analysis of UN peacekeeping deployment on government and rebel associated territory. In contrast to units such as ethnic settlement zones, the grid structure provides a unit which is not endogenous to the settlement itself. Further, the unit allows for standardized conversion of data with different units of analysis, which makes the unit high in reliability and replicability across studies.

One limitation with using the grid is that it may capture several settlement patterns in one square which are geographically distinct due to natural dividers such as rivers and mountains. It also does not capture fine-grained spatial variation such as ethnic power relations across neighbourhoods or villages. However, the unit allows me to capture wider trends within the location of peacekeeping deployment and prevents overestimating a local effect.

To recognize the temporal dynamic of peacekeeping deployment, I use monthly observations at the grid level as my unit of analysis. I include all grid cells in a country which saw a UN mission, and as such observe all locations with government and rebel constituencies with a chance of seeing peacekeeping deployment. Countries are included from the month the mission was established until the mission ends. As such, the data includes a total of 217 823 observations across 2 387 grid cells in nine countries.

#### **4.1.1 Dependent Variable**

UN Peacekeeping deployment for a given cell for a given month is the dependent variable. The data on UN peacekeeping troops deployment are from the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset 2.1 (Cil et. al 2020). The data is

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, 2000-2011

	mean	sd	min	max	obs>0	N
<b>Dependent Variables</b>						
Peacekeeping Onset	0.0013	0.0365	0	1	291	217823
Peacekeeping Presence	0.0478	0.2132	0	1	10407	217823
# of Peacekeepers <i>in100</i>	0.2492	1.8289	0	55	10407	217823
<b>Independent Variables</b>						
Status						217823
<i>Government Ethnic Group</i>					36080	(16.5%)
<i>Rebel Ethnic Group</i>					118651	(54.5%)
<i>Irrelevant Ethnic Group</i>					63092	(29.0%)
Population <i>log</i>	10.3075	1.3586	4.744	14.52	217823	217823
Mountainous Terrain	0.0858	0.1956	0.00	1.00	74579	217823
Travel Time to City <i>log</i>	6.1229	0.6199	4.075	8.665	217823	217823

based on UN Deployment maps of peacekeeping missions and contain information about the location, type, and number of deployments. I operationalise peacekeeping deployment in three ways for robustness: peacekeeping onset, peacekeeping presence, and number of peacekeeping troops. For peacekeeping onset, from 2000 to 2011, my data sees a total of 291 unique peacekeeping deployments to locations which had not seen peacekeeping troops the previous month. For peacekeeping presence, my data contains 10 407 cells with peacekeeping presence across time. This is laid out in Table 4.1. In contrast to onset, peacekeeping presence accounts for the duration peacekeeping troops are present in a location. I also account for the sum variable for the number of peacekeeping troops in a cell measured in hundreds. The median troop deployment is 150 troops, while the biggest deployment is 5500 troops. While deployment is the key interest of this study, previous research has found that the number of peacekeepers also impact successful mandate implementation (Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020).

### 4.1.2 Independent Variable

To statistically analyse the effect of rebel group and government ethnic constituencies on peacekeeping deployment, I rely on settlement patterns of politically relevant ethnic groups. I code whether an ethnic group with a specific settlement pattern sees representation in government, supports a rebel group, or are politically irrelevant.

To determine whether the group is represented in the current government, I draw on the Ethnic Power Relations Core dataset (EPR) (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR dataset maps all politically relevant ethnic groups across time and codes the degree to which a group's representatives held executive-level state power - from total control of the government to political discrimination within a cell. I define groups as belonging to the government if the group is coded as holding monopoly, being dominant, or seeing senior power or junior power in the government. Across the nine countries, it should be noted that none sees an ethnic group occupying a monopoly on state power. Further, only two countries observe a group becoming dominant: the Shaygiyya in Sudan until 2006 and the Mende in Sierra Leone from 2003 to 2006. Instead, all of the countries see senior or junior power sharing systems in the government, with changes in status over time dependent on elections or events. Of the 217 823 monthly grids, 36 080 see government locations.

To determine if a group is related to a rebel group, I draw on the ACD2EPR datasets (Wucherpfennig 2012). The dataset links ethnic groups from the EPR dataset directly to UCDP conflict actors. Inspecting the data, some measures of rebel group affiliation to the ethnic group are more loosely defined. I hence apply a strict definition of rebel group affiliations: whether more than 50% of an ethnic group supports a rebel group. Across the nine countries, out of 217 823 monthly grids, 118 651 are occupied by groups supporting the rebel group.

To map the location of the ethnic constituency for rebel groups and the government, I use the geo-referenced ethnic settlement data from GeoEPR Dataset. The dataset provides multipolygons for the EPR dataset which allows me to map the settlement patterns onto the grid cells (Wucherpfennig et. al 2011).

Ethnic groups overlapping in settlement patterns represents a challenge when I operationalise rebel and government constituencies with the EPR dataset. Several ethnic groups overlap in geographical settlement patterns. Moreover, the grid cell of 50 x 50 km can capture several groups in a cell. 45 914 cells see both rebel and government co-ethnics. Following my theorizing however - that a host-government changes incentives for peacekeeping deployment dependent on a rebel group presence - I code all cells seeing both government and rebel groups as an ethnic constituency of a rebel group. In the appendix, I run robustness checks on my results by coding the mixed cells as government cells. The results remains negative for peacekeeping onset, presence, and size of troops to government co-ethnic constituencies.

There are cases where an ethnic group is represented in the government and is associated with a rebel group, which also requires consideration. I code cases which see an ethnic group associated with both the government and rebel group as ethnic constituencies of the rebel group. For example in Ivory Coast, the rebel-held north from the first and second civil war is associated with the Kru ethnicity. At the same time, the Kru are represented as a junior partner and then senior partner in the government from 2000 to 2011. In South Sudan, the Nuer ethnicity are associated both with a rebel group and with the government as junior partners. In cases where an ethnic group is co-ethnic of a rebel group and represented in government as a junior partner, I code it as a rebel group. I code it as rebel group because the EPR dataset codes a group's access to power from the 1st of January and thus does not capture loss or gains of power in government during the year.

Further, it is for example well known that the representation of Kru and Nuer in government are fundamental to the violent conflicts in Ivory Coast and South Sudan. These groups represent a conflict of interests within the government and are not assumed to yield the same influence as other actors in the government. Thus, ethnic groups in this category are categorized as rebel group.

Lastly, I make a category called ‘irrelevant’ if the group is not represented in government and does not support a rebel group. This allows me to detangle the effects of government co-ethnic constituencies and the ethnic constituencies of rebel groups. The irrelevant groups account for 63 092 observations across space and time. In my models, the ethnic constituencies of rebel groups are the comparison group and thus the intercept. As such, all effects analyses as a significant change in comparison to rebel co-ethnics.

### **4.1.3 Control Variables**

I control for potentially confounding variables. Both geographical peacekeeping deployment and geographical ethnic settlement patterns along political lines may be impacted by the population density, type of terrain, and accessibility. To account for these dynamics, I include three control variables at the cell level: log of population, mean mountainous terrain, and log of the cell’s travel time to a city. The data on population is from Gridded Population of the World v4 from SEDAC, the data on mountainous terrain is from UNDP’s Mountains of the World by UNEP-WCMC, and data on distance to the nearest city is from the PRIO-grid 2.0.

Extensive research has found a strong effect between local UN Peacekeeping deployment and violence. I thus, in the second half of the empirical analysis, control for one-sided-violence (OSV) by rebel groups or the government from

the UCDP Geo-referenced Event Data v.21.1. The data indicates which actor committed the one-sided-violence. While death does not capture all the violence civilians can experience in war (injuries, assaults, robbery, disappearances) it reflects high level of violence in society.

While my controls are in line with quantitative literature on UN Peacekeeping deployment, I am cautious that I cannot present a causal inference of UN peacekeeping deployment, but instead provide strong associations in line with theorization and controlling for confounders which see data availability. There are several major confounding variables that I am unable to account for due to data availability at the monthly, sub-national level. One major confounding variable is that of mass-migration during conflict. One can assume the UN to deploy to newly established refugee camps and cities hosting people at risk. Internally displaced people also change the settlement pattern of politically relevant ethnic groups. As such, this limitation is crucial. Another factor that is the time-variant and space-variant is the change of support for rebel groups over time. This can impact both the percentages supporting an ethnic group, and levels of violence which might again impact peacekeeping troops deployment. With its limitations, I still argue that this research spotlights an under-researched factor associated with UN peacekeeping deployment which in turn can enlighten the efficacy of UN peacekeeping troops in the field.

## **4.2 Results: Determinants of Peacekeeping Deployment**

To analyse how the political status of belligerent groups affect local peacekeeping deployment, I run statistical regressions on peacekeeping deployment in nine



African countries from 2000 to 2011. This analysis focuses on three operationalisations of peacekeeping deployment: whether there was a peacekeeping onset, whether peacekeepers were present, and the troop size of the peacekeeping mission. To understand the determinants of peacekeeping deployment, I analyse whether the grid cell sees the settlement of government, rebel groups, or irrelevant ethnic groups.

Before presenting the statistical models, it is noteworthy to have a look at general patterns and trends in the peacekeeping distribution. While all cells see settlement patterns of ethnic groups, 10 407 see peacekeeping deployment with 291 onsets. As seen in table 4.2 of the 291 onsets, 57 are in government areas, 173 in rebel group areas, and 61 in areas home to politically irrelevant groups. Rebel groups territories hence see almost three times the deployment onsets compared to that of the government. Yet, the largest deployments in terms of size are located in territories associated with the host-government. Peacekeeping grids with government co-ethnics sees an average of 680 peacekeeping troops with a median of 300. In comparison, the rebel group territories saw smaller deployment in size with a median of 150 troops and an average of 444 troops. Troops are more effective at deterring violence the greater they are in size (Fjelde et. al 2019), which speaks to previous findings pointing to peacekeepers only being effective at deterring violence by rebel groups, not by the host government. It is also noteworthy that irrelevant ethnic groups see a high median and mean of troop deployment. In areas where neither the government nor the rebel group have strong political support, civilians are a pool of new resources for both actors in terms of supporters and recruits. As such, it might be the case that the host-government has incentives to use peacekeeping troops to assert sovereignty and legitimacy over the area from the rebel groups (Nomikos and Villa, 2022).

To further illustrate the determinants of peacekeeper troops to locations de-

Table 4.2: **Peacekeeping Deployment across Ethnic Groups**

	Obs	PK Onset	PK Presence	PK Troops Median	PK Troops Mean
Government	36080	57	1909	300	680
Rebel Group	118651	173	6582	150	444
Irrelevant Group	63092	61	1916	450	629

pendent on their political affiliation, Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of troops across government, rebel, and irrelevant groups. The figure illustrates how the majority of peacekeeping deployments are at 150 troops, which is the size that often patrol new areas. For deployments greater in size however - such as in the 2000 range or 4000 range, one can see that these troop deployments are more frequently distributed across government territories than rebel territories. To gain protection from violence, a sizable troop is necessary. Smaller troops are better suited to monitor, report, and increase communication between the parties. The graph hence shows the trend that territories supporting rebel groups see more peacekeeping onsets, while territories of the host-government sees fewer but larger peacekeeping deployments. However, to test whether these trends reflect a more general relationship I turn to statistical analysis.

Next, I examine the local deployment patterns of UN peacekeeping troops more systematically, by estimating logistic regressions models of peacekeeping onsets and peacekeeping deployments, and linear regression models of the natural log + 1 of the size of peacekeeping troops as my dependent variables. The political status of the territory is my independent variable, which can take the value of government, rebel, or irrelevant according to the ethnic group associated with the grid cell. Because this thesis is interested in the difference between political relevant groups, the intercept is rebel groups. The effect of government status on peacekeeping deployment is hence in comparison to rebel group areas. I also con-




Figure 4.2: Number of Peacekeeping Troops Deployed Across Ethnic Groups

trol for confounding variables that can be associated with both UN peacekeeping deployment and ethnic settlement patterns.

In Table 4.3, Model 1, I examine whether the onset of peacekeeping deployment has a relationship with the political status of groups using a binary logistic regression: the coefficient for government co-ethnics is negative associated with -0.317 log units difference to rebel groups and statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In other words, ethnic constituencies of the government reduces the probability of seeing peacekeeping onset by 0.317 compared to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups. The results indicate that there is a relevant difference between rebel and government groups: government territories are associated with fewer peacekeeping onsets than rebel territories. This suggests that peacekeepers do go to rebel territories more than to government territories. This is hence in line with the second hypothesis. Peacekeeping onset does however not capture whether the deployment is of size for the peacekeeping mission to fulfil its mandate, or whether they stay or only patrol the area. It is hence crucial to both analyse the duration as well as the size of the deployment.

Table 4.3: Determinants of Peacekeeping Deployment, 2000-2011 without fixed effects, *Generalized Linear Regression Results*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	PK Onset <i>logistic</i> (1)	PK Presence <i>logistic</i> (2)	Number of PK <sub>log+1</sub> <i>normal</i> (3)
Government Co-ethnic	-0.317** (0.160)	-0.673*** (0.030)	-0.032*** (0.003)
Irrelevant Co-ethnic	-0.359** (0.150)	-0.723*** (0.028)	-0.041*** (0.003)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.257*** (0.060)	0.547*** (0.012)	0.041*** (0.001)
Mountainous Terrain	0.892*** (0.228)	0.620*** (0.044)	0.126*** (0.006)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-1.375*** (0.130)	-1.571*** (0.025)	-0.152*** (0.002)
Constant	-1.364 (1.243)	0.328 (0.234)	0.630*** (0.022)
Observations	217,823	217,823	217,823
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,119.085	66,694.030	328,704.500

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

In Model 2, I analyse peacekeeping deployment as the dependent variable - all cells which saw a deployment of peacekeeping troops over time using a binary logistic regression. The coefficients report a negative effect statistically significant at the 99 percent level for both government groups and irrelevant groups in comparison to rebel groups by reducing the probability of peacekeeping presence by 0.67. This indicates that the effect of a rebel group co-ethnic is associated with more peacekeeping presence over a longer time than government and irrelevant co-ethnics.

Lastly in Model 3, I analyse the effect of political status of groups on the number of peacekeeping troops deployed, measured in natural logs using a linear regression. It could be the case that the government territories see fewer, but larger deployments, as figure 4.2 illustrates. Yet, in a systematic statistical analysis this does not have an average effect: the statistical analysis indicates that the number of peacekeeping troops is negatively affected by host-government territories, statistically significant at the 99 percent level, in comparison to rebel groups. As such, rebel groups see on average larger peacekeeping deployments than government co-ethnics.

From the three models in my first table, the statistical analysis indicates that the relationship between political groups and peacekeeping deployment remains negatively associated with government groups across the three operationalisations of peacekeeping deployment. Across the three models, the control variables remain statistically significant in the same directions, confirming previous findings: peacekeeping deployment is affected by population density, mountainous terrain, and accessibility. Overall, the analysis indicated that rebel group territories see higher peacekeeping onset, peacekeeping presence, and size of deployment than government and irrelevant groups. These findings hence suggest the opposite of my hypothesis - peacekeeping troops are more likely to go to rebel territories than government territories.

### 4.3 Robustness Checks

It is crucial for robustness to understand if these effects hold across countries, or are driven by specific cases. Table 4.4 displays how politically relevant groups are distributed across monthly grid cells of a country. As is apparent, Burundi does not observe variation in its 352 cells. My unit of analysis - the grid-cells of

Table 4.4: Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups Across Countries

	Year of UN Missions	Irrelevant	Rebel	Government
Burundi	2004-2007	0	352	0
CAR	2007-2011	5167	258	2857
Chad	2007-2011	4003	10004	2024
Ivory Coast	2004-2011	1555	6696	2258
DRC	2000-2011	26157	68211	14741
Liberia	2003-2011	1079	1100	1521
Sierra Leone	2000-2006	219	1314	657
South Sudan	2011	540	300	390
Sudan	2005-2011	24372	30416	11632

50X50 km - does not capture the variation in settlement patterns between Hutus and Tutsis. The EPR dataset with its multipolygon of the settlement pattern notes the whole country as settled by both Hutus and Tutsis. Due to my operationalisation of rebel group settlement, the whole country is noted as settled by rebel groups. While one can imagine ways the host-government has an interest in influencing peacekeeping locally in Burundi, the mission in Burundi was short-lived and my data is not fine-grained enough to explore this relationship in this statistical analysis. Burundi can therefore be driving my results and mislead relationships between peacekeeping deployment and political status of groups. I therefore exclude Burundi for robustness checks and add country fixed effects to see if the effects hold.

Further, it is crucial to also test for year fixed effects as the status of groups can change over years, for example before or after an election or before and after a major event. Across all the eight countries there are groups losing and gaining access to the government which can influence the locations of local peacekeeping deployment. In DRC, four ethnic groups gained government-status from 2004-2006. In 2007 however, the four groups lost government status again and became

powerless. In Sudan, the Dinka group gained government power from 2006 to 2010, and in Chad the Toubous in the North became powerless from 2007 onwards. I therefore re-run models without Burundi for peacekeeping onset, peacekeeping presence, and the number of peacekeeping troops with fixed effects for year and country. Standard errors are clustered on the grid level.

Table 4.5: Determinants of Peacekeeping Onset, 2000-2011, *Fixed Effects Generalized Linear Regression Results, excluded Burundi*

	<i>Peacekeeping Onset:</i>		
	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) Logit
<i>Variables</i>			
(Intercept)	-0.9178 (1.736)		
Government Co-ethnic	-0.2878 (0.1851)	-0.2436 (0.1812)	-0.5067*** (0.1656)
Irrelevant Co-ethnic	-0.3277* (0.1741)	-0.3071* (0.1722)	-0.4441** (0.1782)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.2234*** (0.0855)	0.1898** (0.0866)	0.2769*** (0.0849)
Mountainous Terrain	0.7157*** (0.2628)	0.6852** (0.2667)	1.675*** (0.2853)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-1.389*** (0.1629)	-1.410*** (0.1649)	-1.016*** (0.1670)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
Year		Yes	Yes
Country			Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	217,471	217,471	217,471
Squared Correlation	0.00124	0.00257	0.01023
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.06690	0.09482	0.16722

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

In Table 4.5 I look at the determinants of peacekeeping onset dependent on the political status of a territory with fixed effects for year in Model 2, and for fixed effects for year and country in Model 3. To avoid skewed results, Burundi is excluded as an outlier. The intercept is rebel groups. Across the three models, the

effect of government co-ethnics on peacekeeping onset is negative. The government does not have a substantial effect without accounting for fixed effects. The effect of the government in comparison to rebel groups is statistically significant at the 99 percent level when accounting for country fixed effects. As such we can infer that within countries, government territories on average see significantly fewer peacekeeping onsets than rebel groups.

Table 4.6: Determinants of Peacekeeping Presence, 2000-2011, *Fixed Effects Generalized Linear Regression Results, excluded Burundi*

	<i>Peacekeeping Presence:</i>		
	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) Logit
<i>Variables</i>			
(Intercept)	0.3744 (2.419)		
Government Co-ethnic	-0.6702** (0.2648)	-0.7179*** (0.2714)	-1.120*** (0.2508)
Irrelevant Co-ethnic	-0.7199*** (0.2198)	-0.7603*** (0.2214)	-0.7941*** (0.2499)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.5434*** (0.1228)	0.5590*** (0.1222)	0.4635*** (0.1172)
Mountainous Terrain	0.5911* (0.3071)	0.6995** (0.3158)	1.816*** (0.3764)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-1.571*** (0.2320)	-1.554*** (0.2330)	-1.506*** (0.2225)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
Year		Yes	Yes
Country			Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	217,471	217,471	217,471
Squared Correlation	0.10734	0.11215	0.25958
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.19660	0.20933	0.35655

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

In Table 4.6 I examine whether peacekeepers' presence remain affected by the status of groups with fixed effects for year and country, and exclude Burundi. In a similar vein, peacekeeping presence is negatively associated with government



territories across the three models. With country and year fixed effects, government territories are associated with a negative effect on peacekeeping presence significantly different from rebel groups at the 99 percent level, with government territories changing the log odds of peacekeeping presence by -1.12. Government territories hence see significantly less peacekeeping presence than rebel territories. These results show the opposite effect of government territories on peacekeeping presence than my hypothesis. However, of crucial importance is the size deployed to the different territories. The UN peacekeeping troop size can affect peacekeepers ability to be effective in their mandate implementation in the field.

Table 4.7: Determinants of Numbers of Peacekeeping Troops, 2000-2011, *Fixed Effects Generalized Linear Regression Results, excluded Burundi*

	<i>Number of Peacekeeping Troops</i> <sub>log10+1</sub> :		
	(1) normal	(2) normal	(3) normal
<i>Variables</i>			
(Intercept)	0.6460*** (0.2101)		
Government Co-ethnic	-0.0296 (0.0273)	-0.0345 (0.0273)	-0.0802*** (0.0228)
Irrelevant Co-ethnic	-0.0406** (0.0195)	-0.0458** (0.0194)	-0.0445** (0.0187)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.0391*** (0.0099)	0.0433*** (0.0101)	0.0367*** (0.0098)
Mountainous Terrain	0.1008* (0.0560)	0.1062* (0.0560)	0.1695*** (0.0549)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-0.1511*** (0.0227)	-0.1488*** (0.0228)	-0.1044*** (0.0208)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
Year		Yes	Yes
Country			Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	217,471	217,471	217,471
Squared Correlation	0.06673	0.07162	0.21817
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.04417	0.04753	0.15740

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

I turn to robustness checks of the effect of political status on the number of peacekeeping troops in Table 4.7. Here I run a linear regression on the common log of the number of peacekeeping troops with fixed effects for year and country, excluding Burundi. Across the three models, the effect on government territories on the number of peacekeeping troops in comparison to rebel groups is negative, but only statistically significant at the 99 percent level when accounting for fixed effects for country and year.

Table 4.8: Fixed Effect Generalized Linear Regression Results - Robustness test: cells seeing both rebel and government re-coded as 'government'

Dependent Var: Model:	PK Onset (1) Logit	PK Presence (2) Logit	# PK Troops <sub>log</sub> (3) Normal
<i>Variables</i>			
Government + (Mixed)	-0.4824*** (0.1400)	-0.7909*** (0.1960)	-0.0538*** (0.0189)
Irrelevant Co-Ethnics	-0.5329*** (0.1772)	-0.8772*** (0.2483)	-0.0525** (0.0206)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.2832*** (0.0854)	0.4632*** (0.1143)	0.0372*** (0.0098)
Mountainous Terrain	1.686*** (0.2788)	1.920*** (0.3757)	0.1773*** (0.0559)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-0.9518*** (0.1652)	-1.380*** (0.2158)	-0.0988*** (0.0205)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	217,823	217,823	217,823
Squared Correlation	0.01347	0.26553	0.22252
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.17720	0.35644	0.15912

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Lastly, it can be the case that my operationalisation of political groups is driving the strong results for peacekeeping deployment to rebel group areas as opposed to government areas. Recall that the EPR dataset contains several settle-

ment patterns of politically relevant ethnic groups that overlap both in the original dataset and when aggregated to the grid cell level. I operationalise these cells as rebel groups grounded in the theoretical arguments that these incentivise the government to target rebel co-ethnics and avoid increased costs. However, it can also be the case that the government seeks protection with UN peacekeeping forces. As a robustness check, I hence re-code the cells which see both government and rebel ethnic groups to be coded as government territory. I re-run the model for peacekeeping onset, presence, and number of peacekeepers with fixed effects for year and country in Table 4.8. The results remain robust: government territories have a negative effect on peacekeeping onset, presence, and number of peacekeeping troops deployed in comparison to rebel groups statistically significant at the 99 percent level. The size of the coefficients is smaller than the main model, but both the relationship and the direction of the effect remains with statistical significance.

### **4.3.1 Robustness Test: Violence and Peacekeeping Deployment**

The robustness of peacekeeping presence and onset to rebel territories holds when accounting one-sided-violence by both rebel groups and the host-government. I find that the UN - on average - deploy peacekeeping troops to areas with previous violence by both the host-government and rebel groups - but the effect is higher for co-ethnic constituencies of the rebel groups than for government co-ethnic constituencies. I control for the deliberate, strategic killing of civilians through one-sided violence (OSV) by rebel groups or the government with data from UCDP Geo-referenced Event Data v.21.1. The data indicates the actor behind one-sided-violence, the time, and location. While one-sided-violence does not capture all the violence civilians can experience in war (injuries, assaults, robbery, disappearances), it reflects a high level of violence in society and a mandate

of the UN. It is thus an important control.

In Table 4.9 I robustness test whether previous one-sided-violence by rebel groups and the host-government accounts peacekeeping deployment as opposed to the ethnic constituencies of the host-government and rebel groups. It could be the case that my previous finding of peacekeeping deployment to rebel group co-ethnic constituencies are associated with more violence, and thus is a proxy for violence. In line with previous research, I find that the UN indeed deploy to areas of one-sided violence by both actors, measured both in two years and three months prior to deployment. Yet, UN peacekeepers are still deployed less to government co-ethnic constituencies than to rebel group territories, statistically significant at the 99 percent level. In fact, the effect is greater when controlling for one-sided-violence compared to my previous models without peacekeeping deployment.

In Table 4.9 the independent variables for 2 year OSV indicate conflict zones before peacekeeping deployment where civilians were deliberately targeted and killed. Interpreting the coefficients, one can infer that while peacekeepers deploy to violence committed by the host-government two years prior statistically significant at the 99 percent level, this effect disappears if one accounts for a government co-ethnic constituency.

Rebel territories sees more peacekeeping troops if there has been previous violence. Looking at rebel violence in Table 4.9, rebel violence two years prior does not have a significant effect on peacekeeping presence or onset, but has a substantial effect on number of peacekeeping troops deployed to the constituency. In line with previous findings, it can thus indicate that violent areas see substantial troop deployments while ethnic rebel constituencies in general are likely to see smaller troops monitor and report in the area.

Table 4.9: Fixed effects models for peacekeeping deployment dependent on ethnic constituencies of rebel groups and the government, controlling for previous one-sided-violence (2 years and 3 months) by rebel groups and the government

Dependent Variable : Model:	PK Onset (1) Logit	PK Presence (2) Logit	# PK Troops (3) Normal
<i>Variables</i>			
Government Co-Ethnic	-0.4281** (0.1694)	-1.040*** (0.2478)	-0.0761*** (0.0222)
Irrelevant Co-Ethnic	-0.3913** (0.1774)	-0.7282*** (0.2515)	-0.0388** (0.0186)
OSV Reb, 2 Year <i>log</i>	-0.1768 (0.3013)	-0.4813 (0.3738)	-0.0574*** (0.0178)
OSV Reb, 3 Months <i>log</i>	0.7282** (0.3143)	0.9572*** (0.2281)	0.3107*** (0.0785)
OSV Gov, 3 Months <i>log</i>	0.6299* (0.3288)	1.077*** (0.2142)	0.5496*** (0.1178)
OSV Gov, 2 Year <i>log</i>	0.3605*** (0.1162)	0.5435*** (0.1486)	0.1023*** (0.0365)
Population <i>log</i>	0.2377*** (0.0821)	0.4009*** (0.1143)	0.0312*** (0.0095)
Mountainous Terrain	1.563*** (0.2979)	1.706*** (0.3948)	0.1496*** (0.0509)
Travel Time to City <i>log</i>	-0.9789*** (0.1652)	-1.509*** (0.2210)	-0.1031*** (0.0208)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>			
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>			
Observations	217,823	217,823	217,823
Squared Correlation	0.01457	0.28013	0.23652
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.19749	0.37289	0.17061

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Both government and rebel one-sided-violence three months prior to peacekeeping onset, presence, and number of peacekeeping troops have large, substantial effects statistically significant at the 99 percent level. However, when accounting for the strong, negative relationship between government co-ethnic constituencies and peacekeeping presence - this effect almost diminishes in contrast to rebel territories.

When there has been violence in the past three months by either rebel groups or the government, the UN is more likely to deploy sizable troops. Here, the effect of ethnic constituencies are still impactful, but the UN is also able to deploy to government constituencies while it still deploys more to rebel constituencies, on average.

This thesis and hypothesis build on the theoretical assumption and statistical analysis of Fjelde and Hultman (2014); that belligerent groups have a strategic interest in attacking civilians in each others' territories. Fjelde and Hultman test this theoretical assumption looking at all of Africa between 1989 and 2009. The UCDP dataset notes the actor of one-sided-violence as either government or rebel group, and Fjelde and Hultman operationalise the victims based on the political status of the ethnic group from the EPR dataset.

One major limitation in their study is that they operationalise government co-ethnics as groups which see 'monopoly' or 'dominance' on state power. In highly ethnically fragmented countries, no ethnic group sees this power arrangement. In fact, in my data on 9 countries seeing UN peacekeeping mission - not a single country saw this operationalisation of the government. Rather, the common status is either senior partner or junior partner in government. The question is hence if the findings by Fjelde and Hultman (2014) hold in the context of countries without an ethnic group seeing monopoly or dominance in government.

In this thesis I am reliant on the assumption that groups deliberately target civilians in each other's territories more than in their own territory to shape my hypothesis of a government's strategic deployment interests along ethnic lines. One-sided-violence and the status of a group is hence assumed to have a relationship. To avoid multicollinearity in my main models, I did not include one-sided-violence as this is correlated with the status of the territory. In the following table, I attempt to test this assumption on my data.

Table 4.10: Fixed Effect Models for One-Sided-Violence (2 years and 3 months) Across Ethnic Constituencies of Rebel Groups and the Government

One-Sided-Violence <sub>10log</sub> : Model:	Gov 2 years (1)	Gov 3 months (2)	Reb 2 years (3)	Reb 3 months (4)
<i>Variables</i>				
Government Co-Ethnic	-0.0456* (0.0240)	0.0007 (0.0011)	0.0522** (0.0257)	0.0044** (0.0021)
Irrelevant Co-Ethnic	-0.0698*** (0.0165)	0.0004 (0.0008)	0.0172 (0.0190)	0.0041*** (0.0016)
Population <sub>log</sub>	0.0309*** (0.0085)	0.0026*** (0.0006)	-0.0042 (0.0065)	0.0018** (0.0007)
Mountainous Terrain	0.0344 (0.0437)	0.0186*** (0.0046)	0.0390 (0.0452)	0.0442*** (0.0093)
Travel Time to City <sub>log</sub>	-0.0318* (0.0189)	-0.0009 (0.0006)	-0.0238* (0.0143)	-0.0033*** (0.0011)
(Intercept)	0.2652 (0.1612)	-0.0075 (0.0072)	0.2712* (0.1472)	0.0022 (0.0126)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	217,823	217,823	217,823	217,823
Squared Correlation	0.04256	0.00972	0.00432	0.01219
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.05917	-0.00346	0.00517	-0.00614

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

In Table 4.10 I find along previous studies that two years prior to a peace-

keeping mission, the government is more likely to commit one-sided-violence in rebel group co-ethnics territories. Similarly, rebel groups are more likely to target civilians in government territories. This relationship is statistically significant at the 90 percent and 95 percent significant level respectively. The effect of government co-ethnic constituency on one-sided-violence by rebel groups remains positive and statistically at the 95 percent level three months before peacekeeping deployment.

However, the effect for government one-sided-violence in government territories also becomes positive three months before peacekeeping deployment - though not at statistically significant levels. This indicates that the UN does have an impact on how UN peacekeepers impact actors' strategic targeting of civilians; actors change where they target civilians in time leading up to peacekeeping deployment.

In contrast to previous findings, this thus indicates that the UN has a deterring effect on host-government violence in rebel group territories when present. However, my findings also offers insight into why the UN is less efficient at curbing violence by the host-government. Further, as appendix [A.1](#) illustrates, there is a statistically significant interaction effect between one-sided-violence by the government in government territories associated with an overall negative onset of peacekeeping forces and the number of peacekeeping forces. While I have established that the UN deploys less to government territories, the appendix indicates that the UN peacekeepers are particularly unlikely to deploy to government territories where the government has committed one-sided-violence. This finding highlights a crucial obstacle in UN peacekeeping deployment to practice their second key principle - impartiality.

While it is outside the scope of this paper to analyse the efficacy of peacekeeping troops, it can be inferred that the UN has a deterring effect on the host-



government in rebel territories but not in government areas - simply because the UN is less present. Further research on the efficacy of peacekeeping troops can hence benefit from accounting for the deployment of peacekeeping forces along politically relevant ethnic groups. While the UN reduce the rate and intensity of violence, there seem to be patterns for where it is able to do so according to where and when it is deployed.

## 5 | Discussion and Implications

In this thesis, I outlined how a host-government has incentives to influence local UN peacekeeping deployment along its strategic preferences; specifically, the strategy of peacekeeping deployment to rebel group co-ethnic constituencies as opposed to government co-ethnic constituencies. I find robust results across nine countries in Africa from 2000 to 2011 that UN peacekeeping missions are deployed more to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups as opposed to ethnic constituencies of the host-government. When controlling for one-sided-violence on civilians, I find that the UN do deploy to areas of violence, but that this effect diminishes in constituencies of government co-ethnics during peacekeeping operations. I conclude that a host-government can influence which constituencies the UN patrols and monitors with smaller troops, but has less leverage in disturbing peacekeeping deployment for a longer time to cases of grave human-rights abuses. In line with its mandate to remain impartial, the UN attempts to move sizable troops to areas of one-sided-violence.

Where do peacekeepers go? Doing a systematic analysis of my hypothesis - that the concentration of peacekeeping forces will increase around areas with government co-ethnics compared to areas with rebel group co-ethnics - I find opposite results and support for my second hypothesis: peacekeepers go to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups. In my statistical analysis, I find strong indications across all three operationalisations of peacekeeping deployments that peacekeepers are more often deployed to rebel territories, are deployed for a longer period of time, and on average see larger size of deployments than government co-ethnic constituencies. With data from 2000 to 2011 across nine countries, the negative association between deployment to government co-ethnic areas holds under robustness tests with fixed effects for year and country, with and without Burundi,

and for different operationalizations of political status of rebel and government co-ethnics.

My findings imply that, on average, the UN deploys more peacekeepers to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than government co-ethnic constituencies. This finding contributes significant insight into a gap in the literature on the location of peacekeeping deployment. It is essential to understand biases impacting peacekeeping deployment to further understand its efficacy. One cannot expect peacekeepers to be efficient at monitoring human rights practices by the government if it is not stationed there in the first place. This contributes to a biased view of the UN in favouring the host-government. The direction of the findings goes against my hypothesis based on qualitative observations in the field. From a policy perspective this is a positive finding. It indicates that the UN is able - on average - to deploy peacekeeping forces to areas where the host-government in nature has strategic interests to conduct violence. However, further information is needed to understand in which rebel territories the government has strategic interests to conduct violence, and in which rebel territories the host-government reaps the benefits of peacekeeping deployment.

I find that UN peacekeepers are deployed to areas seeing one-sided-violence, but the effect is significantly stronger in ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than ethnic constituencies of the host-government. One way to detangle where the host-government has strategic interests is through analysing areas of violence. This represents strategic interests and hot-beds of the conflict. I control for one-sided-violence by rebel groups and the government two years and 3 months prior to peacekeeping deployment. If there has been previous violence, the UN is significantly more likely to deploy forces as a response to government one-sided-violence. The UN deploys fewer troops as a response to rebel group one-sided-violence, particularly in host-government co-ethnic constituencies.

The reasons the UN deploys less as a response to previous rebel violence as opposed to government violence is grounded in how peacekeeping missions alter patterns of one-sided-violence. Two years prior to an UN peacekeeping mission, I find that the host-government is likely to target civilians in rebel constituencies while rebel groups are likely to target civilians in ethnic constituencies of the government. Yet, during a peacekeeping mission the host-government is more likely to target civilians in government co-ethnic constituencies as shows in the Appendix. While this thesis is not focusing on the efficacy of UN peacekeeping troops, it adds clarity to recent findings that the UN is only able to prevent one-sided-violence by rebel groups and not by the host-government; simply because the UN protects civilians where they are present (see Fjelde and Hultman 2019, Villa and Nomikos 2021). By being less present in government co-ethnic constituencies, the UN is less able to respond to violence. Yet, this finding indicates that UN Peacekeepers do have a deterring effect on the host-government; a stark contradiction to mechanisms introduced in the previous literature (Fjelde and Hultman 2019).

What explains where peacekeepers go? The positive relationship between rebel territories and UN peacekeeping deployment builds on several theoretical mechanisms introduced in previous research and can explain the wide success of the UN in implementing its mandates, as previous findings indicate (Walter et al, 2021). The UN is often deployed to rebel territory where the host-government has limited reach and does not have capacity - or will - to fulfil basic state roles such as provision of public goods and security (Ruggeri et. al 2019). Multidimensional missions are not only mandates to protect civilians but also provide basic state functions for civilians (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013). In practice, this means that UN peacekeepers deploy more to rebel territories than to host-government territories.

Further, another explanation for the strong relationship between the ethnic constituency of rebel groups and peacekeeping onset, presence, and number of peacekeeping troops as opposed to in government co-ethnic constituencies can be a reversed cost-analysis. In some cases, the government sees it as more costly to be monitored in its own territory than the cost the UN implements in rebel territory. Recent research has also highlighted that UN Peacekeeping troops can have a legitimizing effect on sovereignty in contested areas, which further benefits the host-government (Villa, 2021).

The high presence of UN peacekeepers in rebel territories as opposed to host-government territories sheds new light on research on the efficacy of UN peacekeeping troops. It is harder for the UN both to report and monitor the host-government when located in rebel territories. If this is due to explicit influence by the host-government - by directly preventing access to its own controlled territories - or implicitly by the UN wishing to stay on good terms with the UN - can benefit from further research. Interviews with practitioners as well as government officials will be of good use to detangle this mechanism further.

By the UN being significantly more deployed in rebel territories, it also sheds light on impartiality claims made towards the UN. Recall that the UN has been criticised for impartial reporting of rebel activities and crimes, and criticized for under-reporting on crimes committed by the host-government. This research highlights the challenge the UN faces in reporting on, and interfering in, violence committed by the host-government when the UN are less present. The mechanism laid out in the paper - how the UN has to balance the consent of the host-government and impartiality - highlights why the UN is deployed further away from the host-government.

The finding indicates that the UN deploys to areas where the host-government

has limited influence and reach, enabling the UN to provide basic public goods, handle missing information, and be a mediator in the field (Rugger et. al 2019). This research hence further enlightens the findings on peacekeeping efficacy by analysing factors that drive the deployment.

These findings allow for further scope conditions to be analysed in future research. Are there contexts when it is particularly hard for the UN to deploy? Informants across UN peacekeeping missions have in previous research noted that mandate implementation becomes exceptionally challenging around elections; there is change in governments and hence in government consent (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). With time, peacekeeping missions also note that mandate implementation becomes harder as the notion of ‘sovereignty’ manifests (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). While the UN - on average - is able to deploy more troops to rebel territories than to host-government territories, this study does not capture moments in time where this trend changes. Future research should hence continue to research the initial deployment to the benefit of practitioners and academics alike to understand obstacles to mandate implementation.

The findings of this thesis do not come without limitations. Firstly, one major limitation is my operationalisation of the belligerent parties. In the EPR dataset and in reality, some settlement patterns of politically relevant groups overlap. As such, cells can see both rebel groups supporters and government co-ethnics settled in the same grid cell. While the robustness test in Table 4.8 illustrates that changing mixed grids from ‘rebel’ to ‘government’ does not change the result, I am not able to capture local dynamics within a cell. For example, when UN Peacekeeping troops in Sudan were sent to patrol areas and were prevented access at checkpoints in 2010 the peacekeeping troops were deployed within 50 km of interest but were prevented access to specific areas (Lynch, 2014). The grid does not capture this effect.

Further, this study does not capture mass-movement of people under armed conflict and how this impacts settlement patterns of politically relevant ethnic groups. It also does not account for how the salience of the ethnic identity changes over time: the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect can strengthen or weaken ethnic identities depending on political dynamics. The same goes for active support for rebel groups - in this study the data does not capture whether support from an ethnic group changes within a year. This is likely to change for example when a group commits atrocities or loses power. Further insight will benefit from data which systematically map the locations and dates of actions taken by the host-government undermining the status of force agreement with the UN.

Lastly, this thesis does only capture one of many possible strategic interests by the host-government in local UN peacekeeping deployment. By acknowledging the host-government as a strategic actor able to influence the UN, this thesis has opened up an ocean of new research. Further research should carefully map other interests of a host-government. Factors that might impact government interests can also be along economic lines with a focus on natural resources and infrastructure, or as power dynamic changes in the field along local and national elections.

For practitioners working with UN peacekeeping deployment, it is crucial to ensure presence of UN peacekeepers both in rebel and government-controlled areas. The presence among both is crucial for the UN to maintain its imagery of impartiality, particularly amongst the local population but also among the belligerent parties. This deployment pattern should be accounted for at the beginning of the initial deployment before host-government consent starts to deteriorate. Future research should further detangle when in the life-span of a peacekeeping mission new deployment to host-government areas becomes less frequent and harder to implement.

## 6 | Conclusion

In this thesis I have sought to explore a question that is yet to receive attention in the peacekeeping literature: how does the strategic interests of a host-government impact local UN peacekeeping deployment? Where are UN peacekeeping troops deployed accordingly? I map a theoretical framework for the strategic relationship between host-governments and UN peacekeeping missions. I theorize that the host-government has incentives to affect the local peacekeeping deployment, and the UN is faced with balancing its key principles of government consent and impartiality in the field. I focus on one strategic incentive by the host-government and the UN: whether to deploy peacekeeping troops to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups or the government. Analysing the local onset, presence, and size of UN peacekeeping missions in nine countries which see robust mandates to protect civilians from 2000 to 2011, I systematically analyse the effect of rebel and government co-ethnic constituencies. My results show that peacekeepers are deployed more, for a longer time, and in greater size to ethnic constituencies of rebel groups than of the government. When accounting for one-sided-violence on civilians, my results indicates that the UN deploy as a response to violence by both government and rebel groups three months prior. However, peacekeepers only deploy as a response to one-sided-violence in ethnic constituencies of rebel groups as opposed to the government.

The primary limitation of this thesis is to detangle the strategic interest of the host government in peacekeeping deployment. In practice, the host-government has diverse interests which change over time and space in line with dynamics in the field. Acknowledging that the host-government has a significant role in peacekeeping missions, future research will benefit from interviews with state officials to systematically map government interest. In this thesis, government interests



are derived from theory. Promisingly, with the recent practice of UN peacekeeping missions to systematically report when and where a host-government limits peacekeeper's freedom of movement, future research can quantify the impact the host-government has on influencing local UN peacekeeping deployment. Another factor that changes over time and space is the support for belligerent parties by civilians and the power of rebel groups. My data does not capture this change during a year. This research is thus greatly reliant on the 'rally around the flag' assumptions for politically relevant ethnic identities in armed conflict. Future research will benefit from diversified operationalizations of support for belligerent parties.

In answering my research question, I came across additional and important sub-questions. The first question is on UN peacekeeping efficiency: how does the role of the host-government on local peacekeeping deployment affect the efficacy of a UN peacekeeping missions? My results provide some insight into this question. I provide preliminary evidence that patterns of local peacekeeping deployment reflect the mission's ability to respond to one-sided violence by rebel groups as opposed by the host-government. This is in line with previous research on prevention of one-sided-violence. While it is outside the scope of my paper to look at the efficacy of UN peacekeeping missions, my results also indicates that the presence of peacekeeping missions alters the strategic targeting of civilians by the host-government: the government is more likely to target civilians in government co-ethnic constituencies during peacekeeping mission, as opposed to targeting civilians in rebel territories prior to peacekeeping deployment. Second, my findings allow for further scope conditions into when and where collaboration with a host-government becomes particularly difficult, impacting both deployment and efficacy. Future research should consider the effect of elections during a peacekeeping mission, the duration of a mission with the changing perception

of sovereignty, and the dynamics between central and local government actors on UN peacekeeping deployment.

My thesis offers policy considerations for practitioners. The UN faces regular accusations of impartiality by under-reporting and lack of intervention into human-rights abuses by the host-government. One recommendation based on my findings is to ensure peacekeepers are deployed to ethnic constituencies of the host-government as well as of the rebel group from the start of the peacekeeping mission. Previous findings indicate that the UN's presence can better prepare peacekeepers to intervene in and deter violence by the host-government. Further, the UN should put further resources into systematically mapping breaches of SOFA agreements by the host-government across UN peacekeeping missions. In this way, the UN can challenge SOFA breaches on diplomatic arenas and limit direct retaliation in the field by the host-government. This systematic mapping of breaches allows the UN to put pressure on the host-government to comply with its initial SOFA agreement and not draw extensive military benefits from the UN.

Finally, I believe that this thesis has increased our understanding of the strategic interests in UN peacekeeping deployment by a host-government. The host-government is not a passive by-stander. The host-government has strategic goals and interests. It is crucial that research on UN peacekeeping deployment and efficacy accounts for this dynamic. In turn, it highlights the strategic calculations the UN must do for local peacekeeping deployment. While the UN has finite resources and commanders on the ground make difficult choices, these choices are not limited to geographical feature and levels of violence. A UN peacekeeping mission must also balance its key principle of impartiality, while maintaining good relations with the host-government. This thesis sheds light on a wider dilemma on peacekeeping: fostering peace and navigating the sovereignty of a state - who also is an active actor in armed conflict. The greatest challenge of UN peacekeeping

missions is thus not a military challenge in mandate implementation, but rather a political challenge of both practicing impartiality and maintaining good relations with a host-government.

# A | Appendix

## A.1 Logit Model Assumptions

The logistic model assumption assumes that the outcome variable is binary, that there is a linear relationship between the logit outcome and each predictor, that there are no outliers, and that there is no multicollinearity. The outcome PK Onset and PK presence meet the first assumptions of binary outcomes by being coded as ‘1’ if seeing onset/presence or ‘0’ otherwise. In the following section I test the assumptions of linearity, outliers, and multicollinearity. I follow the robustness checks presented by Kassambara (2021) in "Logistic Regression Assumptions and Diagnostics".

### A.1.1 Linearity assumption

For my model, I first check the linear relationship between my continuous control variables and the logit of PK Onset and PK Presence. I do this visually by inspecting the scatter plot between each predictor and the logit values in [A.1](#). The




Figure A.1: Linear Assumption for Logistic Regression. Note: ‘mnt’ stands for mountainous terrain, ‘pop\_log’ stands for logged population, and ‘ttime\_log\_’ stands for logged travel time to nearest city.

smooth scatter plots illustrate that - in order - the variables ‘Mountainous Terrain’, ‘Population - Log’, and ‘Travel Time to City - log’ are linearly associated with peacekeeping onset in logit scale. Mountainous Terrain is less linear in the relationship, but country-fixed effects can control for the different levels of mountains in different countries.

### A.1.2 Outliers

For my models, I test for extreme individual datapoints which can alter the quality of my logistics regression models. First, I examine any extreme values by visualising the Cook’s distance values. I label the five largest values.




Figure A.2: Outliers for PK Onset

In PK onset the outliers are distributed across several observations, while in PK Presence the outliers are all mapped on top of each other. Though there are outliers, not all necessary influence observations. I thus check whether my data has influential outliers by inspecting the standardized residual (SR) errors. If the SR are above 3, they can be possible outliers and deserve closer attention. I plot the standardized residuals in [A.4](#). It can be observed that very few outliers have SR above 3, so their effect is negligible.




Figure A.3: Outliers for PK Presence




Figure A.4: Standardized Residuals for PK Onset and Presence

### A.1.3 Multicollinearity

Lastly, I test the assumption that there is no significant multicollinearity between my independent variables in the two models. I measure the variance inflation factor (VIF), which measures the multicollinearity among my regression variables. Some authors suggest a VIF above 10 is of concern, while others suggest a conservative level of 2.5. Across my variables in the two models, the VIFs are between 1.1 and 1.6. The highest is 1.6 for population. However, this is still far below

the conservative level of a VIF score. I can thus assume that there is no multicollinearity between my variables.

## **A.2 Violence and Ethnic Groups**

This thesis and hypothesis builds on the theoretical assumption and statistical analysis of Fjelde and Hultman (2014); that belligerent groups have a strategic interest in attacking civilians in each others territories. Fjelde and Hultamn test this theoretical assumption looking at all of Africa between 1989 and 2009. The UCDP dataset notes the actor of one-sided-violence as either government or rebel group, and Fjelde and Hultman operationalise the victims based on the political status of the ethnic group from the EPR dataset.

One major limitation in their study is that they operationalise ‘government’ co-ethnics as groups which see ‘monopoly’ or ‘dominance’ on state power. In highly ethnic fragmented countries, no ethnic group sees this power arrangement. In fact, in my data on 9 countries seeing UN peacekeeping mission - not a single country saw this operationalisation of the government. Rather, the most common status is either senior partner or junior partner. The question is hence if the findings by Fjelde and Hultman (2014) hold in the context of countries without an ethnic group seeing monopoly or dominance in government.

In this thesis I am reliant on the assumption that groups deliberately target civilians in each other’s territories more than in their own territory. One-sided-violence and the status of a group is hence assumed to have a relationship. To avoid multicollinearity in my models, I cannot include one-sided-violence as this is correlated with the status of the territory. In the following table, I attempt to test this assumption within my dataset.

One major limitation when I test this assumption on my data is that I do it on data which is seeing peacekeeping troops. As such, the results are driven by the effect of peacekeeping missions and is suffering from omitted variable bias. As such, the results might be driven by peacekeeping troops. Yet, it is sufficient to illustrate the connection between status of ethnic groups and one-sided-violence. The assumption is still that groups should attempt to conduct deliberate attacks on civilians in belligerent territories.

To test whether the host-government attacks civilians in rebel territories, and rebel groups in government territories I run logit models on one-sided-violence in Table [A.1](#). The data on one-sided-violence is from the UCDP Geo-referenced event dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). I operationalise one-sided-violence as a dummy variable for monthly grid cells which see five or more killings. I first look at all one-sided-violence, and then separate between violence by the government and by the rebel group. My independent variable is again the status of the co-ethnic groups of the territory - see research design in the main text. For the statistical models, the government is the intercept.



Table A.1: Fixed Effect For OSV and Status

Dependent Var:	OSV		OSV Reb		OSV Gov	
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
<i>Variables</i>						
(Intercept)	-2.315 (1.471)		-2.635* (1.586)		-5.753** (2.828)	
Rebel	-0.5965*** (0.2016)	-0.5684*** (0.1858)	-0.5273** (0.2238)	-0.4040** (0.2012)	-0.4576 (0.3454)	-0.4283 (0.3515)
Irrelevant	-0.2313 (0.2254)	-0.2346 (0.2231)	-0.0912 (0.2335)	-0.0647 (0.2254)	-0.4193 (0.4744)	-0.3240 (0.4366)
Pop <sub>log</sub>	-0.0212 (0.0762)	0.0125 (0.0823)	-0.0924 (0.0714)	-0.1639** (0.0781)	0.1308 (0.1491)	0.3518** (0.1503)
Mountains	0.9934*** (0.3405)	1.063*** (0.2997)	1.546*** (0.3062)	1.544*** (0.2963)	0.4464 (0.5322)	1.456*** (0.4116)
Travel Time <sub>log</sub>	-0.7001*** (0.1543)	-0.7111*** (0.1661)	-0.6320*** (0.1774)	-0.9226*** (0.1980)	-0.5560** (0.2601)	-0.2285 (0.2477)
Battle Deaths <sub>log</sub>	0.0032 (0.0034)	0.0048 (0.0041)	-0.0013 (0.0036)	-0.0009 (0.0038)	0.0043 (0.0033)	0.0090*** (0.0025)
Spatial lag osv <sub>log</sub>	1.356*** (0.1862)	1.344*** (0.1722)	1.472*** (0.2065)	1.369*** (0.1990)	0.7238* (0.3734)	0.6224** (0.2808)
Decay osv Gov	1.539*** (0.3916)	1.925*** (0.3659)	0.1010 (0.2605)	0.2566 (0.2849)	3.995*** (0.4149)	3.663*** (0.3029)
Decay osv Reb	3.598*** (0.2260)	3.523*** (0.2111)	4.252*** (0.2321)	3.912*** (0.2272)	1.289** (0.5223)	2.072*** (0.4366)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
Country		Yes		Yes		Yes
Year		Yes		Yes		Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	217,823	200,562	217,823	200,562	217,823	200,562
Squared Cor.	0.07222	0.08603	0.06464	0.08889	0.02638	0.04366
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.28318	0.29409	0.32125	0.34383	0.22462	0.26796

*Clustered (priogrid) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

### **A.2.1 Interaction Effect: Violence and Ethnic Constituencies**

There are reasons to assume an interaction effect between violence and ethnic constituencies on peacekeeping deployment. Locations of violence can be explained by the ethnic constituencies of government and rebel groups, and peacekeeping deployment can in turn be explained by peacekeeping deployments. In turn, UN peacekeepers might deploy differently depending on violence committed in ethnic constituencies of the the rebel group and of the government. In Figure [A.2](#) I test the interaction effect. In model 1,3, and 5 I do not identify the actor of the one-sided-violence. The results shows that there indeed is a statistically significant interaction effect on peacekeeping presence and the size of peacekeeping troops. When adding up the coefficients, ethnic constituencies of the host-government seeing one-sided-violence are 1.14 log odds less likely to peacekeepers present than rebel territories. In Model 2, 4, and 6 I account for whether the perpetrator of one-sided-violence is the government or rebel group. The interaction effect in model 6 on the number of peacekeeping troops is statistically significant: government co-ethnic constituencies which sees one-sided-violence by the government receives on average 0.07 log of troops less than ethnic constituencies of rebel groups. Future research should further look into the interaction effect between ethnic constituencies, violence, and peacekeeping presence in host-government incentives for deployment.

Table A.2: Interaction PKO and Violence

Dependent Var: Model:	PK Onset		PK Presence		# PK Troops <sub>10log</sub>	
	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) Logit	(4) Logit	(5) Normal	(6) Normal
<i>Variables</i>						
Government	-0.5009*	-0.5007*	-1.115***	-1.116***	-0.0792*	-0.0792*
	(0.2821)	(0.2820)	(0.3768)	(0.3775)	(0.0415)	(0.0416)
Irrelevant	-0.4577**	-0.4545**	-0.7910***	-0.7954***	-0.0441*	-0.0445*
	(0.1803)	(0.1811)	(0.1702)	(0.1677)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)
Population	0.2758***	0.2758***	0.4598***	0.4588***	0.0365**	0.0363**
	(0.0954)	(0.0953)	(0.1100)	(0.1096)	(0.0143)	(0.0142)
Mountains	1.653***	1.649***	1.792***	1.793***	0.1670***	0.1672***
	(0.1871)	(0.1895)	(0.1783)	(0.1789)	(0.0224)	(0.0223)
Travel Time	-0.9934***	-0.9943***	-1.505***	-1.505***	-0.1042***	-0.1042***
	(0.2311)	(0.2318)	(0.1835)	(0.1824)	(0.0279)	(0.0280)
OSV	0.0012		0.0147***		0.0072**	
	(0.0077)		(0.0047)		(0.0022)	
OSV × Gov	-0.0021		-0.0141***		-0.0072**	
	(0.0078)		(0.0048)		(0.0024)	
OSV × Irrelevant	0.0037		-0.0112***		-0.0056*	
	(0.0076)		(0.0043)		(0.0025)	
OSV Gov		0.0117**		0.0116		0.0067**
		(0.0047)		(0.0077)		(0.0022)
OSV Reb		-0.0006		0.0163		0.0075
		(0.0080)		(0.0106)		(0.0046)
OSV Gov × Gov		-0.0131**		0.0012		-0.0047*
		(0.0066)		(0.0117)		(0.0024)
OSV Gov × Irrelevant		-0.0338		0.0215		0.0101
		(0.0243)		(0.0209)		(0.0083)
OSV Reb × Gov		9.11 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>		-0.0186		-0.0078
		(0.0088)		(0.0119)		(0.0046)
OSV Reb × Irrelevant		0.0055		-0.0133		-0.0064
		(0.0079)		(0.0102)		(0.0046)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	217,823	217,823	217,823	217,823	217,823	217,823
Squared Correlation	0.01312	0.01324	0.26520	0.26559	0.22530	0.22609
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.17750	0.17764	0.36095	0.36120	0.16139	0.16203

*Clustered (country) standard-errors in parentheses*

*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

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